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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the sources of legitimacy for the North Korean regime in an effort 
to explain what role, if any, economic performance has played in keeping the Kim family 
in power. This thesis provides a historical look at the development of the North Korean 
regime from the beginning under Kim Il-sung to the current generation of rule under Kim 
Jong-un. The core argument of the thesis is broken into two major time periods, with the 
economic downturn of the early 1990s serving as the dividing point. Furthermore, 
comparisons with South Korea under Park Chung-hee and reformist China under Deng 
Xiaoping will be made to offer counter-examples of authoritarian regimes that placed a 
priority on economic growth.  
The goal of this thesis is to establish the basis for North Korean regime legitimacy 
as a way to further understand both how the leadership continues to remain in power 
despite grave economic failure and to shed light on possible future developments as a 
result of the current situation. In better understanding the sources of legitimacy in North 
Korea, the international community can be better prepared for the way ahead. 
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A. IMPORTANCE  
Over the last several decades, the North Korean economy has existed in a steady 
state of decline, beginning in the 1970s and reaching peak disaster in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  Despite this situation, and in defiance of many expert predictions, the Kim 
family regime has been able to maintain its iron grip control over the reclusive country.  
As the Cold War came to an end, the regime watched a large portion of the Soviet and 
Chinese aid pool dry up, feeding into the 1995 economic collapse and great famine that 
cost hundreds of thousands of North Korean lives.  The situation today is hardly any 
better, with the majority of the population malnourished, without legitimate work, and 
lacking the basic necessities of life.  While Pyongyang offers a view of success, the 
country outside the capital is a much different situation.  Victor Cha writes that even in 
Kaesong, the second-largest city, “apartment dwellings not only have no heat, they have 
no windows[, and o]utside the city, farmers use old and diseased oxen to till the land.”1  
Additionally, as of 2009, the World Food Program estimated that approximately one-
third of children under five and women suffered from malnourishment and anemia.2 
Despite these conditions, and the disregard for effective economic policy-making, there 
has yet to be a challenge to regime’s right to rule the country.  Why, despite the economic 
despair over the course of decades, has the Kim Il-sung legacy managed to survive to its 
third generation? What role has economic performance historically played in establishing 
and maintaining North Korean regime legitimacy from the beginning of Communist 
control under Kim Il-sung to the present day state under Kim Jong-un? In considering 
this role, what predictions can be made about future regime survival under current 
economic conditions and what possibility exists for the regime to undertake true 
economic reform? 
                                                 
1 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 
165. 
2 Ibid., 198.  
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Examining the role of economic policy and performance in regime legitimacy 
provides a better understanding of this insulated country. First and foremost, by looking 
at the regime’s legitimacy in a historical context, a better understanding of how Kim Il-
sung consolidated his power can be garnered as well as an explanation as to why policy 
decisions were made that allowed the country to reach the situation it is in today.  
Understanding the level of importance the regime has historically placed on economic 
performance will allow policy makers from the international community to better predict 
how effective economic sanctions will be in forcing change. Additionally, by answering 
this research question, further insight can be given to the possibility for the new 
leadership under Kim Jong-un to take meaningful steps toward a China-modeled policy 
of economic modernization.   Finally, this topic will examine the potential outcomes in 
the context of regime survival in the face of the emerging underground capitalist system.  
In order to better assess economic performance and its role in North Korean 
regime legitimacy, attention must first be given to scholarship on political economy in the 
general sense. By looking at what existing scholarship says about the relationship 
between political economy and regime legitimacy, key themes and critical debates can be 
identified.  Applying these themes to the specific case of North Korea serves two 
purposes.  First, political economy scholarship can offer possible explanations as to why 
the regime has made the economic decisions it has, providing further clarity to the role of 
economic performance in regime legitimacy.  Additionally, the case of North Korea may 
also serve to shed light on key debates as well as credit likewise discredit the major 
themes in the scholarship.  With this in mind, it is important to first look at the broad 
subject of political economy before addressing the specifics of North Korea’s economic 
decisions and the source of the regime’s power. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major puzzle motivating this thesis is that the North Korean regime has 
survived without major political dissent despite extremely poor economic performance 
and, in numerous instances, self-imposed economic disaster.  North Koreans, as in most 
cases, worry about economic performance, at the very least to the extent that they depend 
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on the state to provide for basic needs.  Despite this, the regime has felt little public 
backlash even as factories shutdown and the Public Distribution System for food failed, 
leaving many to starve.  In addition, the regime has appeared to inexplicably continue its 
isolationist, security-first policies in the face of growing international pressure and in an 
environment where countries are increasingly interconnected through foreign trade.  The 
North Korean economy has suffered greatly from the regime’s approach, yet the power 
structure remains intact.  What has made it possible for the regime to not blink while 
watching its greatest supporters, the Soviet Union and China, both undergo dramatic 
political-economic modernization as well as normalize relations with the United States?  
Several hypotheses offer potential answers to the core question examined in this 
thesis. Historical evidence would suggest that economic performance was not utilized as 
a source of legitimacy in the early years of Kim Il-sung and his rise to power.  By not 
making the economy a point of emphasis for regime legitimacy, Kim Il-sung was able to 
consolidate power in a manner that would insulate him and future leaders from any 
economic issues that may arise. Bruce Cumings supports this hypothesis when he writes 
of the source of legitimacy, “After every other characteristic attached to this regime…it is 
first of all, and above all, an anti-Japanese entity run by the most hoary-minded 
nationalists in the world.”3  
With the regime’s power not linked directly to economic growth, the results of 
bad policy can be attributed to things such as abandoning true socialist ideology rather 
than poor leadership. This is evidenced by the possible return to its old ideological ways. 
Victor Cha argues that the future of the North Korean economy will be guided by 
political ideology, writing that the “neojuche revivalism characterizes the economic 
reforms of the mid-1990s to mid-2000s as a temporary straying from the core ideology.”4 
If this is the case, then it can be expected that economic sanctions such as the current 
ones imposed by the United Nations will have little impact other than to further hurt 
                                                 
3 Bruce Cumings, “Why Did So Many Influential Americans Think North Korea Would Collapse,” in 
The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations, ed. Suk Hi Kim, 
Terence Roehrig, and Bernhard Seliger (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 57. 
4 Cha, The Impossible State, 153. 
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innocent civilians and give additional fuel to the regime’s juche, or self-reliance, 
ideology.  
It is possible, however, that economic performance has played a larger role in 
regime legitimacy than history would lead us to believe, but still only serving as one of 
several sources.  In this case, regime survival could be explained by the idea that the 
negative impacts of poor economic performance have been mitigated by these other 
sources of regime power such as nationalism and propaganda.  Scott Snyder writes that 
the “North Korean leadership has used totalitarian methods of political mobilization to 
maintain control despite the breakdown of the economic system.”5 Byman and Lind echo 
this argument when they discuss the regime’s use of propaganda to create a story in 
which, “The North Korean narrative depicts South Koreans as contaminated by 
association with the impure Americans and as juche’s mirror image—servile flunkeys to 
American masters.”6 In this line of thinking, life may be difficult in North Korea, but it is 
even worse in the capitalist puppet-state of South Korea where American soldiers harass 
women and run over South Korean children.7  If this hypothesis is true, then it is possible 
that by effectively attacking the other sources of power, the veil could be lifted off of the 
true state of the economy, exposing the regime to the blame it deserves. 
A third hypothesis exists that views the economy as a method of control for the 
regime and takes into consideration the underground free markets that are continuing to 
emerge out of the economic collapse of the mid-1990s. As with the first hypothesis, 
economic performance has played little role in the historical legacy of the Kim family 
regime and its claim to power, allowing the regime to survive turmoil that would bring 
almost any other authoritarian rule to an end. Instead, the regime treated economic 
institutions and policies as an extension of its authoritarian control over society. In doing 
                                                 
5 Scott Snyder, “North Korea’s Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for 
the Future,” Public Affairs 73, no. 4 (2001) 533, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672442. 
6 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in 
North Korea,” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 53–54, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40784646.   
 7 B. R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves—And Why It Matters, 
(Brooklyn: Melville House, 2010), 170. 
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so the leadership created a society dependent on the state and was able to fuel the 
narrative that Kim Il-sung was a fatherly leader for the Korean people. In this context, 
maintaining actual growth has not been important, only upholding the image that society 
receives all it needs to live from the regime matters. By placing little emphasis on 
developing the economy, however, the regime has forced the people to take matters into 
their own hands and thus capitalism has found its way across the borders.  Victor Cha and 
Nicholas Anderson write that, “in search of food and opportunity, North Koreans began 
risking life and limb to cross the border with China by the thousands.”8  As the 
international community continues to pressure the regime with sanctions, and the regime 
continues to defy these sanctions, the North Korean citizens will continue to be pushed 
into individualism, free enterprise, and less reliance on the state.  As Cha and Anderson 
note, free markets have become the reliable means of survival in North Korea and these 
“markets create entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurship creates an individualist way of 
thinking alien to the government.”9  If this case is true, the regime’s demise could very 
well be at its own hand as the forces of underground capitalism continue to collide with 
staunch authoritarianism and the leadership loses its reach into society and control over 
the people. As will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion, the continuing growth 
of the illegal free markets displays a new level of disobedience towards the regime and its 
rigid polices. With this disobedience—and the corruption it requires to continue—the 
regime could become weaker, opening it up to outright challenge. While the evidence 
found in this research offers a degree of support for each of these hypotheses, it is this 
third one that has the strongest case. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Victor D. Cha and Nicholas D. Anderson, “A North Korean Spring?” The Washington Quarterly 35, 
no. 1 (2012): 15, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641728.   
9 Ibid., 16.  
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C. METHODS 
This thesis will primarily be a historical case study of North Korea and the Kim 
regime, with a comparative element in terms of two distinct time periods. The focus will 
be on looking at the methods Kim Il-sung used to establish his power at the beginning 
and how this hold on leadership has been perpetuated throughout North Korea’s 
contemporary history. The first time period to be covered will look at 1949 until the early 
1990s, examining the critical beginning of the regime, how it established legitimacy, and 
the economic policies it pursued.  In the second time period, the thesis will look at the 
early-1990s until the present day, and in doing so will examine the effects of the 
decisions made in the first thirty years.  Dividing the North Korean timeline in such a 
matter builds a causal analysis, with the beginning of the rapid downturn of the economy 
serving as the transition point between the two.   The economic policy decisions made by 
the regime will be analyzed.  In this analysis, the arguments of political economy 
scholarship as discussed in the literature review will be used to offer deeper explanation 
as to why the regime made the decisions it did.  The intention of this analysis is to 
provide evidence to the thesis that economic performance has little importance in regime 
legitimacy in North Korea as well as to understand how the state devolved into the 
situation that exists at present.  Analyzing the decisions that were made and the source of 
legitimacy will develop better understanding of how the international community should 
approach the North Korea issue and how the bottom-up marketization could impact the 
regime’s future. 
While most of the writing will focus on North Korea, comparative methods will be 
used in some instances to illustrate different paths that have been taken by North Korea’s 
neighboring states.  A separate comparative case study will be offered for each of the two 
time periods addressed.  In the first time period, the case of South Korea under Park 
Chung-hee offers comparison as a politically extractive regime that was able to enhance 
economic growth for the benefit of the entire state. Likewise, the comparison for the second 
time period will focus on China as an example of a similar political system that 
implemented meaningful reforms under Deng Xiaoping to recover from poor economic 
decisions of the past and followed a different path to legitimacy.  
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Additional literature focused on these case studies will be used in order to make 
these comparisons. All sources used will be secondary and open-source material. With a 
case study like North Korea, it is important to understand that it is not possible to say with 
100 percent accuracy what constitutes the true situation. Through information garnered 
from defectors and limited glimpses inside the closed off country, scholars and journalists 
have built a good knowledge base but it is hard to be confident about the inner workings of 
the regime and the North Korean society as a whole. With these caveats, this thesis aims to 
pull from resources that utilize widely accepted arguments on how the regime works, what 
has driven its survival, and the social and economic situations that have developed as a 
result. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
As the research question calls for a look at the development of regime legitimacy, 
it is best to address the answer in terms of the key periods of the regime itself. By 
breaking up the thesis in this manner, the question can be looked at in terms of initial 
power consolidation, perpetuation of the regime to the present, and what it could mean 
for the future.  The remainder of this thesis will consist of a literature review, two major 
empirical chapters, and a conclusion chapter, with more details as follows.   
Chapter II will be a two-part literature review grounding the thesis. The first part 
will look at general scholarship on the relationship between political economy and regime 
legitimacy.  The second part of this review will look at case specific literature that 
discusses not only the North Korean issue, but also that of other East Asian powers— 
more specifically China, Japan, and South Korea.  By studying these additional cases, 
comparisons can be offered to the North Korean example for further discussion in the 
remaining chapters. 
Chapter III will be the first of the two major empirical chapters.  This chapter will 
look at the time period of the establishment of the regime under Kim Il-sung following 
WWII up through the early 1990s. The time period covered is both the initial creation of 
regime legitimacy as well as the economically productive times of the North Korean 
society.  In this chapter, the South Korea case will offer an effective comparison of how 
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that country, under the authoritarian leadership of Park Chung-hee, chose a much 
different path with much different economic results. In this light, the South Korean 
perspective will offer contrast as an example of an extractive political institution that 
used its political power to seek economic prosperity as a priority. As such, the evidence 
presented in this chapter will help to create an understanding of the economic decisions 
made in both this time period as well as in the time period covered by Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV will focus on the time period of the early 1990s up to present-day 
North Korea, covering the downturn of the economy and the passing of state control from 
founder to son to grandson.  The comparison for this chapter will briefly look at South 
Korea as its divergent economic path converges with a political one, leading to eventual 
democratization.  Picking up where South Korea left off, the majority of the comparisons 
for North Korea during this time period will focus on post-Mao China and the reforms 
made under Deng Xiaoping, providing a second example of an extractive political regime 
that placed economic prosperity at the forefront. Additionally, this chapter will continue 
to focus upon the sources of legitimacy established in Chapter III to help explain how the 
regime survived such a tumultuous time in its history.  In doing so, this chapter will 
provide further evidence to the research question’s answer, helping to solidify the 
relationship between economic performance and regime legitimacy.  Additionally, this 
chapter will help to answer why the economic decisions were made and how these 
choices led to the situation that exists today. 
The conclusion will look at the time present day and into the future.  The focus of 
this chapter will be on using the historical legacy of the regime to predict its future and 
attempt to answer the issues generated by the research question.  The conclusion will 
seek to answer what the policy and scholarship implications are with regard to the North 
Korean case.  It will be used to take the present day situation and explain how it could 
impact the regime’s survival if current policies are maintained. In this context, what 
possibility exists for methods such as economic sanctions and offers of foreign 
investment to have a genuine impact on Politburo policy?  If the source of legitimacy is 
elsewhere, how does the international community open up the country and persuade 
North Korean leaders that economic modernization is in their best interest?  Is it possible 
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that the new regime recognizes the danger of the situation as it exists today and is willing 
to pursue growth rather than military strength? The conclusion will explore how the 
growing underground capitalist movement allows society to pursue individual means of 
survival and establish personal wealth. To this end, the conclusion will examine how this 
movement could impact the regime’s societal control and break down the foundation of 
Kim family rule.  
 10
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of my thesis and research question is to understand the importance 
placed on economic performance for establishing and maintaining the North Korean 
regime legitimacy.  Before answering this question, however, a step back must be taken 
with a broader look at the subject of political economy.  To better understand the policy 
decisions made by the North Korean authoritarian leadership, a general understanding 
must be had of what existing scholarship says about political economy and economic 
performance and their relationship to regime legitimacy and regime stability.  In looking 
at the evidence of the North Korean case, an easy conclusion could be that the regime 
and/or its people do not place a premium on the need for economic modernization in 
order to maintain its position.  The deeper, and in some regard more important question, 
however, is why the regime places such a low priority on economic growth.  Studying 
current political economy scholarship on the broader issue will help to provide an answer 
to the how and why of North Korea’s economic policy decisions.  
In discussing the relationship between economic performance and regime 
legitimacy, the political economy scholarship addresses the role of incentives in decision-
making, the impact that foreign aid has in incentivizing political leaders, the importance 
of institutions, and the need for external forces to break an authoritarian regime out of 
predatory practices.  In addition to these agreed-upon themes, there is a long-standing 
scholarly debate on whether authoritarianism or democracy is better for economic 
growth.  Discussing each of these arguments will provide ways to further explain the 
individual case of North Korea, the decisions the regime has made, and how the situation 
has developed into what it is at present day. 
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B. KEY THEMES IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY SCHOLARSHIP 
1. Elite Incentives 
In trying to understand the economic policy decisions of political leaders, a heavy 
importance is placed on looking at the incentives that those leaders face to choose one 
path or the other.  When individuals seek to make decisions, they often give more 
consideration to the choice with the better payout.  So, too, is this true for political 
regimes.  The issue of incentives rears its ugly head especially when dealing with 
authoritarian regimes such as in North Korea.  With no real checks on political power, 
these regimes lack incentive to seek economic performance that will benefit the country 
as a whole and rather look to use the position of power to seek personal gain and wealth.  
Without risk to political survival, political elites can be best viewed as predators who lack 
the incentives to pursue economic progress. In these cases the costs of predation will not 
outweigh its benefits in the eyes of the leaders.10 While the autocrat has incentive to 
ensure his country is productive he also has incentive to extract the most out of his 
society for personal gain. 11 While the roving bandit, or economic predator, may settle 
down as Bates states, Olson remarks that “The same rational self-interest that makes a 
roving bandit settle down and provide government…also makes him extract the 
maximum possible amount from society for himself.” 12 Bates writes that “The political 
roots of development productively join with the economic when specialists in violence 
realize that they can best survive and prevail by promoting the prosperity of their 
economic base.”13  
The unfortunate reality, however, is that most authoritarian regimes ignore this 
basic idea, and as Acemoglu and Robinson argue, the draw of the extractive system is too 
difficult to overcome.  Through this system, the political elite at the top holds the wealth 
                                                 
10 Robert H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2010), 87 
11 Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” The American Political Science 
Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 569. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736 .  
12 Ibid. 
13 Bates, Prosperity and Violence, 85.  
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and power and the incentive is to remain in power regardless of its impact on the state’s 
economy. The result of this system is the vicious cycle, as the authors refer to it, and in 
this process the extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, 
enriching the few at the expense of many. 14 This line of thinking seems counterintuitive 
to rational thought—the better a state performs economically the more there is to draw 
from—but the nature of an authoritarian regime is to utilize its position of unchallenged 
rule to accrue wealth while it still holds the power. By giving absolute political power to 
an individual or small group of elites, these leaders are given the tools of oppression and 
abuse. 
2. Aid and Incentives 
Further complicating the issue of incentivizing regimes is the modern-era concept 
of foreign aid.  Although foreign aid is given with good intentions, its distribution creates 
a major hurdle for true reform in an authoritarian regime.  Aid offers a scapegoat of sorts, 
a way for regimes to cover up the impact of poor economic decisions. The ability to seek 
assistance from other states removes the incentive to create good economic policy.  As 
Bates writes, following World War II foreign aid created a situation where, “development 
was no longer a precondition for survival in the international arena; poor states remained 
intact,” and leaders found it more important to negotiate with other states than with their 
own citizens.15  In this new international context, the possibility of foreign aid allowed 
political leaders to seek assistance from rich, industrial nations rather than finding ways 
to strengthen local economies through domestic policy.16 Bates’ claim is evidenced by 
the case of North Korea.  In the early years of the regime large amounts of aid from 
China and the Soviet Union propped up the economy and allowed the leadership to 
pursue a policy of self-reliance and military first. These bad economic decisions 
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Poverty (New York: Crown, 2012), 343. 
15 Bates, Prosperity and Violence, 66. 
16 Ibid., 63.  
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culminated with the economic collapse and famine of the mid-1990s, and foreign aid was 
there to relieve pressure from the regime.   
It is important to note that the scholarship on this issue is not advocating the 
ceasing of foreign aid, but rather addressing the issues with its disbursement and the 
complications when dealing with an authoritarian regime.  In these systems, foreign aid 
becomes a source of income for the regime and an enabler of bad policy. Knowing the 
difficulty of ignoring the humanitarian call to assist those without, autocratic leaders are 
confident that the aid will continue to flow without consequences being enforced.  
Haggard and Noland support this idea when they write that “as is true in any aid game, 
the North Korean government sought to maximize flows of aid while limiting the 
conditions attached to it.”17 By ignoring demands for more transparency, aid in North 
Korea “That goes to market has some positive effects but is also contributing to the 
creation of a privileged class of state-sector entrepreneurs and their allies and an 
increasingly stratified society.”18 In these situations, foreign aid helps to fill the void 
created by an extractive economic system, and in doing so helps to keep the elite on their 
thrones and quiet any discontent among the populace.  
3. Institutional Capacity and Design 
As is the case with many relationships, the one between political economy and 
regime legitimacy is not a simple one.  While creating the right incentives and conducting 
meaningful aid reform is a start, as the scholarship discusses, it is not enough to correct 
the issue of development. Political economists also address the need for strong, effective 
institutions for meaningful economic progress to be made.  Evans writes that “the most 
effective states are characterized by embedded autonomy, which joins well-developed, 
bureaucratic internal organization with dense public-private ties.”19 Acemoglu and 
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Robinson echo this when they observe that in Colombia, “Lawlessness and insecure 
property rights are endemic in large swaths of the country, and this is a consequence of 
the lack of control by the national state…and the particular form of lack of state 
centralization in Columbia.”20 A strong state both effectively implements policy and 
instills confidence in the public.  As Olson remarks, “[People] need a secure government 
that respects individual rights[, and] individual rights are normally an artifact of a special 
set of government institutions.”21 Marking the difference between strong and weak state 
capacity, Evans provides the examples of the former Zaire and Japan.  In Zaire, he writes, 
“The combination of weak internal organization and individual external ties produce[d] 
an incoherent absolutist domination,” while in Japan, “the administrative apparatus that 
oversaw Japan’s industrial transformation was as impressive as the transformation 
itself.”22  
More than just strong institutions, however, the need is also for the correct form 
of institutions—and it is the lack thereof that remains a persistent problem in 
authoritarian regimes. As Acemoglu and Robinson discuss, it is the difference between 
inclusive and extractive institutions that determines whether or not wealth is used to 
increase political power or pursue economic development.23 In dealing directly with 
North Korea they write that “The Communist economic institutions were in turn 
supported by extractive political institutions, concentrating all power in the hands of the 
Communist parties [with] no constraints on the exercise of this power.”24 As the 
scholarship shows, development needs a strong state apparatus that has both the capacity 
and intent to pursue economic growth.  Even a regime with the correct intentions will 
struggle to succeed if it does not possess the ability to both effectively garner public trust 
in the system and implement economic policy decisions.  
                                                 
20 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 383. 
21 Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” 572.  
22 Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses,” 571; Ibid., 572. 
23 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 383. 
24 Ibid., 390.  
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4. Pressures for Reform 
While the discussions above and the existing scholarship would agree that it is 
easy for an authoritarian regime to become a predatory state, not all hope is lost.  The 
caveat with this claim, however, is that while breaking the cycle is not impossible, it is 
also not easy. Political economists agree that in most situations an external shock or a 
degree of external pressure is needed to push the regime in the direction of reform. To 
break vicious cycles, Acemoglu and Robinson note, takes “Either some preexisting 
inclusive elements in institutions, or the presence of broad coalitions leading the fight 
against the existing regime, or just the contingent nature of history.”25 Bates adds to the 
argument that external shocks such as that of the Soviet Union collapse compounded with 
the debt crisis led to changes in economic policy and to the restructuring of politics in the 
developing world.26 While this has truth in many cases in the developing world, the 
North Korean regime has shown more resilience than many experts predicted. The 
question to then answer is why this is the case, further pointing to the fact that changing a 
regime’s path is not a simple task.  Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s broad coalition offers a 
way in which domestic forces external to the regime could mount pressure to force the 
leadership to change, but as Olson notes, it is a mistake to assume that the masses will 
simply overthrow a brutal autocrat.  He argues that “Historical evidence…indicates that 
resolute autocrats can survive even when they impose heinous amounts of suffering upon 
their peoples[, and] when they are replaced, it is for other reasons…and often by another 
stationary bandit.”27 With North Korea as a prime example, the task of breaking the 
predatory cycle has thus proven to be a difficult one.  Further exploring the how-to of 
altering a regime’s extractive practices offers a chance to develop new approaches to 
handling the North Korea question. 
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5. Regime Type 
Out of the agreed upon themes of political economy scholarship arises a major 
debate, one that has been alluded to already in this literature review.  Which regime type 
is better for development, authoritarian or democratic? The argumentation outlined above 
leads to a quick answer that authoritarian regimes stunt economic growth in the name of 
personal gain and therefore democracies are better. Przeworski and Limongi would 
caution against this conclusion, writing that “It does not seem to be democracy or 
authoritarianism per se that makes the difference but something else.”28 In their opinion, 
the relationship between politics and economics is about more than just regime type and 
is a topic that must be examined further. Operating on the other end of this debate, 
Chalmers Johnson, with his developmental state model, would argue this is not entirely 
true.  In this model it was the soft authoritarian regimes in states like Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan that allowed them to make the tough economic decisions to spark growth.  In 
being shielded from the political fallout of such decisions, these regimes were able to 
place economic development at the forefront of all policy discussion.  
Many scholars argue, however, that the fact that these regimes were successful 
does not tip the scale in favor of authoritarianism.  First, it must be recognized that these 
regimes were “soft-authoritarian” and not true autocratic regimes. These quasi-autocratic 
governments provided long-term political stability necessary to pursue “a set of economic 
priorities that seems unattainable under true political pluralism,” while also practicing, 
“Some self-imposed restrictions on the scope of power of the ruling party.”29 Second, it is 
possible for predatory states to experience growth—Acemoglu and Robinson argue as 
much—but the real debate is on true sustained development.  Is it just a coincidence that 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are now all democratic states?  Acemoglu and Robinson 
                                                 
28 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 3 (1993): 65, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138442.  
29 Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationships in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” in The Political Economy of the New Asian 
Industrialism, ed. Frederic C. Deyo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 137; Minxin Pei, 
“Constructing the Political Foundations of an Economic Miracle,” in Behind East Asian Growth: The 
Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity, ed. Henry S. Rowen (London: Routledge, 1998), 50. 
 18
note that pluralism supports the idea of rule of law, a concept impossible under a 
monarchy, and this in turn feeds inclusive economic institutions.30 Olson supports this 
argument when he writes that the conditions that create a lasting democracy also 
encourage economic development.31 Authoritarian insulation may enable tough decisions 
to be made, but as Olson remarks, “Democratic political competitions…[do] not give the 
leader of the government the incentive that an autocrat has to extract the 
maximum…surplus from the society[.]”32 By making themselves answerable to society, 
inclusive political institutions have a much greater incentive to pursue effective policy to 
establish their legitimacy and right to rule. As inclusive economic and political 
institutions are deeply connected, it is clear that political legitimacy is reliant on 
economic performance in these types of systems.  Additionally, as Robert Bates states, 
“The creation of parliamentary forms of government creates incentives for those who 
possess power to employ it in the interests of those who possess wealth.”33 The danger 
with a true authoritarian regime is that those who possess the political power also possess 
the economic wealth. In creating a system in which a few acquire the political and 
economic wealth of the state, extractive regimes have little need to pursue policies that 
develop true legitimacy. Under these regimes, meaningful legitimacy can easily be 
replaced by coercive strength, making shared growth far less important than the ability to 
buy off the right support. There exists evidence to support both sides of this debate, but 
the correct answer depends more on the arguments discussed in the previous paragraphs 
than on simply which regime type is better.  To this end, the answer becomes more about 
which regime type has the greater incentives for development and the better chance to 
develop meaningful institutions to pursue growth. 
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C. APPLYING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY SCHOLARSHIP TO NORTH 
KOREA 
This broad look into the themes of political economy scholarship has provided a 
set of tools to break down, analyze, and better understand the situation that exists inside 
the North Korean state. In gaining an understanding of the role that incentives and 
institutions play in a regime’s policy decisions, a more critical explanation can be made 
of why the Kim regime made certain choices. What incentives did Kim Il-sung and his 
party elite have at the beginning and how have these incentives perpetuated throughout 
the generations? What sources of legitimacy has the Kim regime relied upon and how has 
the country’s economic performance affected the regime’s mechanisms for asserting and 
retaining control? What types of institutions exist within the state and does the leadership 
possess the apparatus necessary to implement reform if such a path were chosen?  
Knowing how foreign aid in the modern era has impacted developmental 
decision-making provides an additional explanation of how the regime has been able to 
survive despite economic failure. Understanding the incentives of the regime and the fact 
that a broad coalition to force change domestically does not exist gives the international 
community a better idea of the external pressures that can be effective in forcing reform.  
Additionally, while no movement for political change exists, perhaps the emerging 
marketization provides an opportunity to create more economic inclusiveness and break 
Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s vicious cycle. Finally, a deeper look into the application of 
political economy scholarship to the North Korean case will provide more clarity to the 
debate of which regime type is better for sustained development. Just as the scholarship 
can be used to support arguments for the causes of the situation in North Korea, the case 
of North Korea will in turn provide further evidence for the political economy discussion. 
This thesis will explore these themes. 
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III. THE PILLARS OF THE REGIME AND THE FOUNDATION 
OF FAILURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the War in the Pacific was drawing to a close—and with it the end of Japanese 
imperialism—the Korean peninsula emerged as a country divided. The Cold War 
between the Soviet Union and the United States was beginning to take shape and with 
this, Korea became a battleground between the two new world powers.  The future of the 
two Koreas would be laid within this context. In South Korea, it was the United States 
that led the rebuilding process while in the north the support and influence flowed in 
from the Soviet Union and the newly communist People’s Republic of China.  What 
initially began as an arbitrary line to divide responsibilities between the Allied Powers 
began to take on a new meaning.  It began to represent a division of opposing ideologies, 
with contrasting political and economic systems topped by differing political leaders.  
While both regimes put in place were authoritarian in nature, very few other similarities 
can be found. The Korean War and its three years of fighting from 1950 to 1953 only 
served to reemphasize the differences between the two countries and further fortify the 
38th Parallel. Left to their own devices, the leaders of North and South Korea—Kim Il-
sung and Syngman Rhee, respectively—would pursue divergent paths for their countries. 
The courses of the two Koreas would diverge even more in the 1960s with the new 
authoritarian rule in South Korea under Park Chung-hee.  Although Park’s tight control 
over South Korea resembled Kim’s hold on the north, Park utilized his control to spark 
industrial development in the relatively poor South Korea and actively pursued a policy 
goal to create economic growth and development. Park’s regime laid the foundation for 
one of East Asia’s great economic success stories, while on the other side of the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) an economically advantaged North Korea slowly declined. 
Handpicked by the Soviets and Stalin, Kim Il-sung—who was a relatively 
unknown commodity with little political experience—entered the North Korean spotlight 
in 1945 as the leader of the Soviet-founded Korean Worker’s Party. In this context, the 
young leader had to work quickly to establish his rule: as Cha writes, “Kim Il-sung 
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worked assiduously to consolidate his power once he took the reins of leadership in 
Pyongyang from the Soviets.”34 Through political purging and a growing propaganda 
machine, Kim and his party officials created a narrative for both the leader and North 
Korea.  This narrative became intertwined with the regime’s legitimacy and was founded 
on several elements.  North Korean nationalism and anti-Japanese imperialism were at 
the root of the narrative and would evolve into a greater sense of self-reliance and general 
anti-colonialism. The concept of economic growth received little attention during this 
regime establishment phase.  Economics mattered to the regime only in so much as was 
necessary to support the narrative and help to perpetuate the myth of socialism, 
militarism, and isolationism—and furthermore as a way to exercise control over the 
North Korean people. Economic prosperity intentionally took a back seat as the regime 
focused on other sources of legitimacy—ones that operated in direct conflict with the 
steps needed to pursue economic development.  Byman and Lind note that with a regime 
like North Korea, a healthy economy is less important than the regime’s ability to 
continue to buy the support of the elite, enabling them to maintain their position of 
power.35 This economics-last mentality was created in the very beginning and would 
perpetuate itself throughout the country’s trajectory. 
B. CREATING THE NARRATIVE AND MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
1. The Power of Nationalism 
Nationalism can be a valuable tool and a powerful unifying force, particularly in a 
place overcoming brutal imperial rule, and “nationalistic credibility is a particularly 
important form of regime legitimacy.”36  Byman and Lind add that authoritarian regimes 
are known to use the existence of external threats to generate a sense of xenophobic 
nationalism to generate legitimacy.37 The continuous presence of the U.S. on Korean soil 
and the experiences of Japanese imperialism made this an easier task in North Korea. 
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Korean pride is a peninsula-wide sentiment, and “Koreans on both sides are an extremely 
nationalistic people[,] emphasizing the unique ethnic homogeneity of the people.”38 
Koreans remember the fact that their peninsula has seen many invasions and at the end of 
World War II the memories of the brutal Japanese rule was still very fresh. The strong 
sense of nationalism elevated the anti-Japanese warriors to the spotlight and even in 
Syngman Rhee’s South Korea, “many Koreans-in-exile who returned to the country after 
1945 joined the Korean Communist Party in the South as nationalists and patriots.”39  
From the very beginning of his rise to power, Kim Il-sung seized on these sentiments to 
help build his narrative and develop the source of legitimacy for his regime to not only 
run the north but also the future unified Korea. In this regard, the regime immediately 
rewrote the history books to create the new leader’s desired image.  The authoritarian 
nature of the state and the control over information and education it possessed allowed 
for this to happen.  Kim Il-sung was depicted as a great military leader who led 
successful campaigns to drive out the imperialist Japanese.  This image was further 
enhanced with the historical recounting of the Korean War, a war in which the Great 
Leader heroically led the defense of the Fatherland from the U.S. aggressors.  By twisting 
history and events, the regime was able to fuel its rise to legitimacy with nationalistic 
sentiments.  Thus, “Regime mythology represents Kim Il-sung as a filial son of an anti-
Japanese fighter, descended from a pantheon of revolutionary ancestors,”40 a direct play 
to the nationalistic hearts of the North Korean people. 
2. Creating the Man, Myth, and Legend 
The twisting of words and control of information was not used just to fuel 
nationalistic support for the regime. These methods were also used to create a cult of 
personality for Kim Il-sung that would eventually elevate him to god-like status.  This 
factor would be a vital factor in helping to facilitate the unchallenged transfer of power 
within the family—first to his son and then grandson. Assuming the title of Great Leader, 
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Kim Il-sung positioned himself as the supreme leader of North Korea and in doing so he 
removed all evidence of Soviet support and became the self-proclaimed founder of the 
Korean Worker’s Party, Korea People’s Army, and in essence the North Korean state.  
This status is evidenced today, where he is still the nation’s Supreme Leader even after 
his death.  His legacy as a leader of guerilla fighters was also used to create the idea that 
his claim to leadership was both rightful and as a result of his great military 
accomplishments.  Chong-Sik Lee writes that “The image projected by official historians 
is that Kim…was the only Korean leader who had materially contributed to the liberation 
of Korea[,]” and by this virtue, “the mantle of power fell upon his shoulders naturally.”41  
Kim Il-sung was not only elevated as a great leader, however; he was also built up 
to be a parental figure for the North Korean people—a parent who willingly bore the 
responsibility of protecting his children from the dangers of the outside world. The image 
thus created for Kim Il-sung revolved around a filial ideal rather than a stern one.  In 
doing so, “The state therefore created a narrative in which the job of the citizens was to 
work for and care for the mother (Kim), who was constantly toiling to provide for the 
family (state).”42 This filial piety created a sentiment of reverence among the population 
towards Kim, helping to insulate the leader from any dissatisfaction with the political 
system. The regime used the Korean values grounded in Confucianism to build a deep 
sense of loyalty towards the leader just as a child would have towards their parents and in 
doing so created a sense of trust and belief that the regime would always do what was 
best for the people and would always work to provide the basic necessities of life. 
Doubting these facts would elicit a deep sense of guilt, thus giving Kim a tighter 
psychological control over the North Korea people. Kim Il-sung successfully transformed 
himself into more than just a leader. “For North Korea, this is a Stalinist age, and Kim is 
the all-conquering, all-wise hero to whom everyone must pay homage.”43 
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3. Juche: A Unique Ideology for a Unique Regime 
Perhaps the most vital building block in the early path to legitimacy for the Kim 
regime was the ideology that Kim Il-sung created and utilized to support and explain state 
policy. In 1955, Kim Il-sung introduced the idea of juche, or self-reliance, as the guiding 
political ideology for the North Korean path to success and the socialist utopia.  While it 
was not formally adopted as the sole guiding principle for the state until 1970, juche was 
very much employed in the early years for power consolidation and regime 
legitimization.44  This ideology served as the bridge between nationalism and the cult of 
personality that had been created, developing into a political ideology unique to North 
Korea.  Haggard and Noland write that, “North Korea ideology in fact combines a 
number of elements—extreme nationalism, Stalinism, even Confucian dynasticism—into 
a complex mix.”45 A unique take on communist ideals, juche effectively defined mass 
collectivism in terms of Confucianism rather than traditional Marxist ideals.46 This 
approach to socialism made it much easier for the regime to impress it upon the North 
Korean population—and in turn developed into the strong control an authoritarian regime 
needs over its people. The quick move to mass collectivization created a society 
dependent on the regime while the play on Confucianism created the sentiment that 
dependence was welcomed and necessary. Through this ideology, “Concepts of respect 
and hierarchy…worked very well for the control motives of the government,” and 
continues that “the masses would serve the state leader just as children would show filial 
piety to their parents.”47  
The success of this ideology is aided by the control it provides and by the 
propaganda that is used to convince the people that nobody can be trusted.  Cha writes 
that “Juche’s ‘self-reliance’ did not mean autarky, but independence and freedom from 
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the pressures and influence of external powers.”48 Additionally, as Byman and Lind note, 
“It prescribes citizens to use creativity and independence to build a thriving society, so 
North Korea can protect itself from its capitalist enemies.”49 For an easy example of what 
could happen if this ideology was abandoned the regime simply had to point to the south.  
South Korea in the 1950s and 1960s offered a stark case study to present to the North 
Korean population about the dangers of outsiders.  While the entire Korean peninsula 
suffered from the destruction of the war, the South had a much more difficult time with 
the rebuilding efforts at the beginning.  The North was quickly redeveloping its industrial 
infrastructure while, “By comparison, the South’s struggling agrarian economy could 
barely get off the round despite large amounts of foreign-development assistance, mostly 
from the United States.”50 Under the Syngman Rhee regime, the South Korean economy 
saw almost no growth and from 1953-1961 the average per capita GNP grew by just one 
percent, topping out a $100 in 1961.51 Rhee’s authoritarian rule, while tolerated by the 
U.S. as a better alternative to communism, was fraught with political and economic 
corruption. More concerned with staying in power, the elder leader concentrated his 
power on pushing out the opposition and buying off support. Under Rhee’s highly 
patrimonial system, “Seven years of spiraling corruption undermined rational functioning 
of the state bureaucracy, while ineptitude and venality became palpable to the educated 
populace.”52 The Kim regime in North Korea pointed to the economically disadvantaged 
South Korea and attributed the situation to the fact that the United States and other 
capitalist outsiders were allowed in and were freely imposing their imperialistic will on 
the population. When Park Chung-hee came to power he quickly placed economic 
development as a top priority, yet he faced an uphill battle. By contrast, at the time, Park 
had to contend with a North Korea, “that was fulfilling the social contract, providing for 
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its people, and anti-imperialist/nationalist (meaning anti-Japan) in its political stance.”53 
In a time when political economy was thought to favor socialism as key to economic 
growth, Park had to “demonstrate the effectiveness of a non-communist path to 
industrialization and military security.”54  
It is important to recognize that while the juche policy was very strict in regard to 
adherence by the population, it had a level of policy flexibility built into it.  This 
flexibility allowed the regime to explain policy decisions and justify the contradictions 
that these policies posed to the ideology itself.  A prime example of this is the 
justification for dependence on Soviet and Chinese aid: this aid still fell under juche 
guidelines because “it was doing what was good for Korea.”55 Byman and Lind write that 
with nationalism, “Leaders dodge responsibility for country’s problems by decrying 
foreign machinations…and use [foreign] enemies to justify high military budgets.”56 
These same principles were used to perpetuate the juche mentality—and to great effect. 
4. Strength versus Legitimacy: A Means to Ensure Control 
In examining authoritarian regimes a distinction must be made between regime 
legitimacy and regime strength.  Often times these characteristics are mistakenly 
considered one and the same.  Yet a regime can be strong without having recognition as a 
legitimate authority by the majority population. An example of this idea is present day 
Syria and the on-going struggle between the current leadership and the rebel groups. In 
this situation, President al-Assad has been able to maintain his position despite large 
portions of the population denouncing his right to rule the country.  The leadership in this 
case possesses the strength of military support and thus has been able to remain in power. 
Likewise it is possible for a regime to be recognized as legitimate—even revered—by 
most within the country but still be incapable of exercising total control, a sign of 
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weakness in autocracies. The situation in Colombia serves to illustrate this second 
scenario. In this case, the government is widely accepted as legitimate by the Colombian 
populace but it lacks the centralized capacity to exercise effective control in the areas on 
the periphery. In Colombia, “Though the state is able to provide security and public 
services in large urban areas such as Bogotá and Barranquilla, there are significant parts 
of the country where it provides few public services and almost no law and order.”57   
This latter situation will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  For much of 
the North Korean regime under both Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il these two 
characteristics, legitimacy and strength, were intertwined and operated in close linkage 
with one another. To develop his legitimacy, Kim Il-sung used the strength garnered from 
his war legacy—both real and fabricated—and from the fact that he was chosen by the 
Soviets. This recognition, in turn, brought more strength both in the form of benevolent 
following and an emerging practice of coercive leverage.  By developing more strength 
and freely demonstrating the willingness to use his extensive reach into society, Kim Il-
sung was able to enact the policies he wanted, push the spread of socialism, and 
implement the ideology that would be used to further legitimize his authority.  Thus a 
continuous feedback circle was built between regime strength and legitimacy with each 
feeding into one another and working together to produce a legitimate leadership with the 
capacity to reach down to the individual citizen with great effect. 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the cult of personality that created a parental 
image of Kim Il-sung to encourage North Koreans to follow his guidance as a child 
would a parent; however, it was not all done through willing obedience. As is the case 
with most authoritarian regimes the use of force—and merely just the threat of it—
created a very real reminder to every North Korean of what would happen should they 
choose to go against the party, the regime, and the socialist revolution. With the 
foundation of his legitimacy established, the use of coercive strength developed into an 
effective tool to further control the North Korean people. While the narrative and 
propaganda was used to establish the legacy of Kim Il-sung, coercion became a 
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supplementary tool to further ensure obedience and adherence to regime policy. 
Totalitarian regimes are not hesitant to punish dissenters whether it is through execution, 
disappearance, or exile to gulags.  These regimes also typically punish more than just the 
guilty individual, seeking out family members for punishment.58 North Korean control 
tactics illustrate this thinking perfectly.  As Cha remarks, “[The North Korean regime] 
severely punishes with physical and mental abuse any perceived violation of laws, 
without any juridical fairness.”59 This punishment started from the beginning, with Kim 
Il-sung working quickly to purge all political opposition from North Korea, so that by 
1956 his successful campaign had cleared the way to allow him to rule North Korea with 
uncontested authority.60  
Subsequently, too, the leadership developed a system of harsh punishments to 
encourage party and regime loyalty.  Minor offenses could be punished with a stint of 
reeducation while the most serious infractions resulted in immediate execution. “Dissent 
is detected through an elaborate network of informants working for multiple internal 
security agencies,” write Byman and Lind.61 To add to the level of fear, Kim Il-sung 
enacted a “three generations policy” under which, “Parents, spouses, children, aunts, 
uncles, and cousins may be punished [as a result of an individual’s wrongdoings].”62 In 
addition to relying upon the state-run agencies, Kim Il-sung began the practice of using 
his socialist indoctrination process to not only educate all that communism was the path 
to utopia but also to instill a sense of duty in every citizen.  In this regard he successfully 
created a society in which everybody and anybody could be a spy for the regime, 
reporting the misdeeds of neighbors and family alike.  This method created a sense of 
distrust amongst everyday North Koreans and thus ensured that no anti-regime thoughts 
could spread across a community. Nobody dared speak to a neighbor or friend about 
dissatisfaction for fear of ending up in one of the gulags.  These gulags, originally 
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devised to hold those victims of the political purge that were not executed, became a 
symbol of the dangers of dissent and the harshness of the Kim regime. 
While this fear tactic and the extensive use of internal watchers were extremely 
successful in building the regime’s capacity to control the people—an effective ability to 
utilize the strength of coercion—, Kim Il-sung applied an additional tactic to further 
protect himself from threats within the party elite itself. Byman and Lind argue that 
“Aside from a popular revolt, authoritarian regimes may be unseated in a coup d’état by 
members of the military or the government.”63 Indoctrination of the people and the threat 
of punishment had worked to secure the common members of the working class and Kim 
Il-sung had successfully purged political opposition at the beginning of his reign.  A man 
this concerned with regime survival and personal power, however, could not take any 
chances and sought to surround himself at the top with only those whom he could truly 
trust. He gave key party and government positions to members of his family and to from 
the guerrilla forces he had led, further enhancing his job security.64  In this regard, loyalty 
at the top was secured through blood ties and reinforced with the threat of severe 
punishment. Kim Il-sung’s extensive security apparatus and methods of punishment 
helped to protect his regime from a movement by the masses and his method of political 
positioning insulated him from the possibility of an internal power struggle. 
5. The Absent Role of Economics 
Where did the economy fall on the spectrum of priorities for regime legitimacy? 
From the start it was somewhere near the bottom if even on the list at all. A simple 
explanation for why economic prosperity was not included in the building of the narrative 
is that it could not afford it nor did it have to at the time.  The need to for foreign trade 
and investment to support economic growth would have contradicted with the self-reliant 
ideology and development would have pulled resources away from military buildup. 
Additionally, North Korea was in a much better position economically than its southern 
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neighbor at the end of Japanese rule. Cha notes that “By 1945…the northern half 
possessed 76 percent of the peninsula’s mining production, 80 percent of its heavy 
industrial capacity, and 92% of its electricity-generation capabilities.”65 While much of 
this initial infrastructure was destroyed as a result of Kim Il-sung’s attempt to reunify the 
peninsula through force, the regime was the benefactor of a second critical economic gift 
in its early years—heavy support and aid from the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).  With the Cold War fight between capitalism and socialism in 
full swing, the communist state was rebuilt through the provision of heavy industry 
equipment from the Soviets and key resources such as crude oil and food from the 
Chinese. These factors provided further evidence for the regime to tout in front of its 
people as a demonstration that Kim Il-sung and his communist system were better than 
the South Korean life filled with political corruption, capitalism, and oppression under 
the American imperialists.  
The economic plan from the beginning was to ride on the outside support of North 
Korea’s communist brethren and extract as much as possible from society to strengthen 
the regime. The plan would be successful as long as the aid pool remained large enough 
to sustain military spending but beginning in the early 1970s this pool began to shrink.  
The regime refused to revise its self-reliance policy and instead became even more 
committed to it. This early test for the regime and its response made it clear that 
economic performance had no place in maintaining its legitimacy to rule the country. 
McEachern writes that “Revolutionary generals argued that the state should provide 
defense before considering economic goals [and] Kim Il-sung ultimately heeded [their 
advice] and restricted the role of economic technocrats.”66 The state had an official 
policy of economic self-reliance but had taken very few steps to create a system that 
could support itself.  Over the next twenty years the regime would begin to feel the pains 
of a policy that ignored economic development in favor of military spending. Cha writes 
that “North Korean leaders largely abandoned the rebalancing of the economy…and 
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instead focused on building an ‘impenetrable fortress,’ pulling resources from other 
sectors.”67 As impenetrable as the country might be, the economy and infrastructure 
began to deteriorate from a lack of attention. 
C. PERPETUATING POWER DESPITE SUSTAINED DECLINE 
1. A Double-Edged Sword 
In the first couple of decades, Kim Il-sung and his regime benefited greatly from 
the Cold War environment. As the aid continued to come in from the Soviet Union and 
China, the regime was able to keep its economy afloat and continue to push its closed-off, 
self-reliant policy. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s allowed North Korea to play the 
two powers against one another, remaining on middle ground and enhancing the support 
it received from both countries. These aid inputs were used to prop up the regime, accrue 
wealth for the political elite, build a massive military, and provide enough basic 
sustenance for the common North Korean that nobody question government policy. The 
juche ideology worked to great effect in creating situation the regime desired.  A 
subservient society charged by nationalism and the desire to please their leader now 
existed. The support of the early Cold War years helped to facilitate this ideology and 
provided Kim Il-sung with the economic base he needed to pursue his militarization of 
the country. Juche justified military expansion as a necessary step to defend the Korean 
people from the imperialists to the south who had already thwarted unification once 
before and would not hesitate to do so again. Despite early warning signs that attention 
was needed, economic modernization continued to take backstage to need to enhance 
means of protecting national security and continued military buildup. Cha writes that “By 
the late 1960s to early 1970s, it had built up the fourth largest standing army in the 
Communist bloc at 408,000 troops.” Strictly speaking, “Based on either total spending or 
the spending on investment plus operation and management, the net assessment shows 
that the South became inferior to the North in the late 1960s and the 1970s[.]”68 North 
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Korea’s commitment to closing the gap was made clear and by 1979, with a new standing 
army of 692,000, Kim Il-sung had finally overtaken the South—which had continued to 
maintain a steady force level of around 600,000 since the end of the Korean War.69  
What the regime failed to do was invest in the future, instead hedging all bets on 
the idea that Moscow and Beijing could not and would not let North Korea fail. As the 
years continued to pass with little policy modification, the industrial infrastructure that 
had once been a source of pride and capability in North Korea started to show its age. In 
this sense, the decision-making in Pyongyang seemed content with wasting a great 
economic opportunity.  Rather than investing the heavy doses of foreign aid into 
enhancing the state’s heavy industry base, the opposite course was taken as more and 
more resources were taken from the industrial and other sectors to facilitate the regime’s 
quest for military superiority. As Acemoglu and Robinson have recently agreed, it is easy 
for an authoritarian regime to fall into the trap of economic extraction and North Korea 
was no exception. For authoritarian regimes, the concern is with remaining in power and, 
“Economic institutions that create incentives for economic progress may simultaneously 
redistribute income and power in such a way that a predatory dictator and others with 
political power may become worse off.”70 With enough capital to fund its priorities, 
unchallenged legitimacy, and an obedient society to abuse, the regime lacked incentives 
to seek economic reform on its own.   
On the other side of the DMZ, the new regime under General Park Chung Hee 
was taking a different approach to authoritarian rule.  Park exercised strict political 
control but he had a much different priority in mind—economic growth.  Unlike Kim Il-
sung, Park recognized that the key to a powerful country was found in economic 
modernization. As Woo-Cumings wrote, the South Korean regime, “[Tightened] the grip 
of authoritarian politics, and with the steering mechanism thus made predictable, [made] 
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a Big Push with massive investments in [heavy industries.]”71 In North Korea the 
extractive capability of the regime was used to further oppress the people and push a 
failing ideology while in South Korea the regime’s political insulation was used to push 
through policies necessary to spark investment in the future and developing the economy, 
even if these policies would be viewed as unfavorable. The South Korean government 
used the threat to national security as a motivation much as the North did but, unlike 
Pyongyang, Seoul recognized that a sustainable future was necessary to secure its 
sovereignty.  
In reality, Park’s regime was actively pursuing the idea of self-reliance while Kim 
simply used it as a cover for poor decisions and to justify isolationism. In addition to 
allowing heavy industry to crumble, the North Korean regime also failed to develop the 
light industry and agricultural sectors that would be needed to help sustain its people. 
Through its juche ideology the Kim Il-sung regime was able to develop a strong level of 
control and create the façade that fueled the legitimacy of the regime. Emerging on the 
darker side of this policy, however, was a North Korea that had no favorable trade 
relationships established, was spending its limited income on military might, and was 
beginning to see its pool of aid disappear. To add fuel to the fire, Park’s regime was 
successfully turning a bleak situation to a profitable one, closing the economic disparity 
between the two countries and by 1974, South Korea’s GNP per capita overtook that of 
the North’s (see Figure 1).  Capitalism’s rapid success below the 38th began poking holes 
in the North Korean narrative.  
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Figure 1.  Per Capita GNP72 
2. Disaster on the Horizon 
Kim Il-sung marched into the 1980s as an emboldened leader, solidifying his 
ultimate power the previous decade when the 1972 constitution named him to the newly 
created position of president—a title neither Stalin nor Mao ever received.73 This decade 
was marked with a number of developing driving forces that would alter the course of 
North Korea and the regime. Kim Jong-il officially became the leader in waiting, making 
it clear that Kim Il-sung fully intended to keep authoritarian rule within the family.  At 
the same time, the juche ideology and the economic isolation it called for began to rear its 
ugly head as the North Korean economy stagnated.  The end of the 1970s had brought 
with it the normalization of relations between the United States and China, a huge blow 
to North Korea’s psyche and more importantly its aid pool. Now things seemed to be 
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warming up between the United States and the Soviet Union as well and the regime was 
losing another economic leg to stand on.  
To make matters worse, the American puppet regime to the south had managed to 
catch and then surpass North Korea economically.  This storyline threw a large wrench 
into the regime’s narrative that North Korea was the Promised Land and that life would 
always be better in the self-declared socialist utopia.  Additionally, South Korea’s 
economic growth put more pressure on the communists to further military buildup as 
Park Chung-hee had now created a system that could support a large national defense 
budget and was closing the disparity between the two militaries as well. While troop 
numbers continued to favor the North, the modernization and capabilities scale was 
tipped in favor of the South. By 1985, South Korea’s military spending was 5.3 percent 
of its 83.7 billion dollar GNP while North Korea was spending at an alarming  
23.1 percent of a much smaller GNP of 15.1 billion.74 Based on this information South 
Korea spent 4.43 billion on its military while the North only spent 3.48 billion, showing 
that economic success under Park Chung-hee allowed the South to better pursue military 
modernization with less impact on the economy than Kim Il-sung and the North. The 
growing democracy movement and eventual democratization of South Korea, however, 
served as a warning to the North Korean regime of the possible dangers to 
authoritarianism that economic reform could bring.  In this context, this decade witnessed 
a redoubling of efforts on institutional and societal control and from a policy perspective 
it was much more of the same. This is evidenced by the fact that of North Korea’s 
estimated 11.25 billion dollars spent in 1985, approximately 62.5 percent was for the 
people’s economy and 20.7 percent towards sociocultural expenditures—a clear 
indication of the financial burden of Kim’s planned economy and societal control.75 
First entering the political scene in the early 1970s, Kim Jong-il struggled at the 
beginning to establish himself as the rightful successor to his father.  Unlike Kim Il-sung, 
the son did not have the anti-Japanese revolutionary background to fall back on and use 
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to feed off North Korea nationalism.  Cha remarks that “The Son never served a day in 
the military, and yet in a militaristic society where revolutionary credentials are a 
requirement of leadership, he had to have some.”76 The belief now is that he made up for 
this deficiency through the planning and execution of several terrorist acts to include a 
bombing of Gimpo International Airport in South Korea in 1986.77 Additionally, the 
leader-to-be used his early position in charge of the propaganda machine to intensify the 
cult of personality of his father and in doing so he worked to tie it to his own status.  In 
deifying his father in the eyes of the North Korean people, Kim Jong-il created an 
undeniable right to rule through his bloodline connection with the Great Leader. While 
feeding off of his father’s personality cult he went to work on his own as well with the 
propaganda department producing stories of his on-the-spot guidance to his father and of 
his exploits as a young leader in the socialist revolution.78 
Initially, Kim Jong-il was not entirely popular as the choice to lead the regime 
into the next generation. He wasted no time in solving this issue through the same type of 
strong-arm tactics his father had used when he consolidated power forty years prior. As 
McEachern writes, “The security apparatus purged those who opposed Kim Jong-il’s 
selection [as the heir-apparent].”79 He continues noting that targeted purges were not the 
only practice used and Kim Jong-il quickly demonstrated his willingness to assert is 
power through arbitrary repression.80 In targeting all those who appeared disloyal to his 
father, Kim Jong-il effectively cleared a path for his eventual and unchallenged rise to the 
seat of power.81 Like his father as well, Kim Jong-il quickly began to place those he 
could trust into key positions as a way to pre-position the circle of power for when he 
took control: “As [the] old guard die[d] off, Kim Jong-il…methodically replaced them 
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with individuals of known loyalty.”82 Once again, the new generation of authoritarian 
rule was creating a fear tactic to control dissent while utilizing family and close ties to 
insulate against threat from the senior positions of the party and the government. 
As the 1980s gave way to the 1990s, Kim Il-sung prepared to officially hand the 
reigns of the regime over to the next generation in the family monarchy, his son Kim 
Jong-il. Despite the clear signs that the economy was in grave danger, the Great Leader 
continued to assure the North Korean populace that their system was working.  Rhee 
writes of a message in 1991 in which the leader remarked that “The secret success of 
socialism in our country lies in the fact that we strengthened [juche] in the process of 
constructing socialism.”83 The sad truth of the matter is that socialism was failing in 
North Korea and this failure was further exacerbated by the self-reliant nature of the 
juche ideology and the economic isolation it created. In the mid-1980s food shortages 
began to appear, productivity was down, industrial equipment was in rapid decay, and 
power outages were becoming commonplace.84 By contrast, at the end of this decade, 
South Korea successfully hosted the 1988 Olympics and was normalizing trade relations 
with Eastern bloc countries to include the Soviet Union. Both of these were indicators 
that the South Korea economy, which had witnessed double-digit growth rates, was 
succeeding far more than the socialist system. Kim Jong-il would prove to be a different 
leader from his father, but unfortunately for the North Korean people, the role of 
economic planning would remain insignificant with this second iteration of authoritarian 
rule. Cha writes that given the situation, “It should therefore come as no surprise that 
during these years of the Son’s unofficial rule, the North pursued the ultimate equalizer: 
nuclear weapons.”85 On the verge of economic collapse this move only further isolated 
the country, demonstrated the regime’s priorities, and, unfortunately for the North Korean 
people, would do nothing to ease their struggles with everyday life. 
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IV. FROM FAMINE TO REFORM? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s ushered in a new era for both the international community and for 
North Korea. The impact of decades of poor planning and policy were mounting for the 
Kim regime and the collapse of the Soviet Union—and the trade that went along with 
it—combined with massive monsoons and floods in 1995 to create the perfect storm for 
economic collapse. As Oh and Hassig write, “North Korea’s economy faltered in the 
1970s, declined in the 1980s, and collapsed in the 1990s.”86 This collapse led to a 
complete breakdown of the Public Distribution System (PDS)—the sole method of 
securing food for sixty to seventy percent of the population—and the great famine from 
1995–1998.87  
This time period also saw the death of Kim Il-sung, the Great Leader, and the 
official transfer of power to his son Kim Jong-il, named the Dear Leader.  Although the 
father died in 1994, it was not until 1998 that the Supreme People’s Assembly elected 
Kim Jong-il as the new leader of the country—and they did so amid wide international 
speculation that he would fail.88 As Cha writes, “South Korean analysts in the summer of 
1994 affirmed…that the Son would not last through the end of the calendar year.”89 The 
fact that he took over at such a tumultuous time for the reclusive state only enhanced 
predictions that his reign would be short lived.  Being a much different person from his 
father and faced with a grave economic situation, the new leader offered hope for change. 
It was believed that the Dear Leader had a choice between reform or regime collapse, and 
after all, “Only dramatic reversal in Pyongyang’s policies in the direction of economic 
reform could revive the country[.]”90 At the same time North Korea’s ally, China, offered 
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a model by which the new regime could reform. Having felt the pains of a disastrous 
Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the PRC was rapidly recovering through 
economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping. In the post-Mao era, China was successful 
implementing a capitalist market economy within a socialist political system.  Kim Jong-
il, however, chose a third path for his legacy and instead introduced the new ideology of 
songun chongchi, or military-first politics, highlighted by the rapid development of a 
nuclear weapons program. While differing from his father’s juche ideology, the economic 
consequences were just the same as Kim Jong-il drove North Korea further into isolation 
from the international community. 
Filled with half-hearted reforms, nuclear weapons development—which brought 
subsequent UN sanctions as a result—and a heavy reliance on foreign aid and illicit 
activities, the seventeen-year Kim Jong-il period was short when compared to his father’s 
reign.  This was, however, not due to his political failings but rather his health. While his 
death was unexpected, the tradition of dynastic leadership succession was never in 
question. As a 2002 editorial in the Rodong Sinmun stated, “The final victory of the 
Revolution needed to be multigenerational,” and what the father—or the son—could not 
accomplish, was to pass to the next generation, one of the grandsons.91 In 2010, with his 
newly awarded rank of four-star general and the number two position in the Central 
Military Committee, it became clear that the youngest grandson, Kim Jong-un, was the 
heir to his father’s throne.  He, too, chose an ideology to justify policies, pursuing what 
has been named neojuche revivalism, a return to the self-reliance ideology of Kim Il-sung 
mixed with the songun ideology of Kim Jong-il.92 In this context the grandson decided to 
revert to the Cold War days of economic isolation while also justifying continued pursuit 
of nuclear weapons. Both the son and grandson demonstrated the importance of ideology 
to the regime’s legitimacy, but also demonstrated a shift in its role. Where juche ideology 
had played more of the driving role for policy under Kim Il-sung, the later renditions of 
ideology became more of an explanation/justification for policies. In the early years of 
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Kim Il-sung, policy decisions were made in strict adherence to the prescriptions of the 
juche ideology. In the post-famine years, ideology became a moldable tool that was 
shaped to match decisions that had to be made in the face of new challenges. In this 
regard, the regime made the decisions it had to in order to stay in power and then adjusted 
ideology to justify these choices. To aid in these efforts, in the 1990s the regime also 
introduced the concept of urisik sahoejuui, or our-style socialism. In doing so, the 
leadership aimed to separate North Korean socialism away from the failed Soviet bloc, 
insisting the North Korean socialism was “unique, inseparable from the leadership of 
Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and ‘people-centered’—exactly what the DPRK had been 
saying about juche for decades.”93 Additionally, ideology became a way to insulate the 
regime from failures of the state. The failed economy and subsequent economic reforms 
were attributed to a departure from adherence to ideology rather than to the missteps of 
Kim Jong-il. Protecting the leadership from blame protected the hereditary transfer of 
power. 
While ideology was utilized as a means to defeat threats to regime legitimacy, 
there was an emerging issue that indoctrination, education, and propaganda have not been 
able to quell. A new trend that began with the collapse of the PDS in the early 1990s and 
continued to gain momentum through the past two decades was the emergence of 
capitalist-style markets. Shifting between allowing these markets to emerge and 
attempting to break them up, the regimes of both Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have 
proven incapable of stopping participation in rudimentary forms of capitalism. 
Pyongyang’s inability to stop individualistic, entrepreneurial thinking is a potential sign 
that the regime’s reach into the local communities is waning in the face of economic 
failure and the need for personal survival. 
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B. MANAGING A FAILED ECONOMY 
1. Bottoming Out 
The 1990s proved to be a disastrous decade for the North Korean economy. Per 
capita GNP dropped from an estimated $1,142 in 1990 to an estimated $573 in 1998 and 
the country experienced nine straight years of negative growth (see Figure 2).94 Outside 
of the pure economic impacts, the 1990s also saw a grave situation for the North Korean 
population.  While the exact numbers are unknown, it is estimated that between 600,000 
and 1,000,000—three to five percent of the total population—died as a result of the great 
famine during this period.95 With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear to see that the 
economic collapse and the great famine of the 1990s was a long time coming for North 
Korea. It is also clear that while natural disasters expedited the system’s demise, it is 
impossible to deny that the foundation of the issue was grounded in poor economic 
planning over the previous decades.  While the monsoons and floods were unavoidable, 
“The country’s vulnerability to those conditions was exacerbated at every point by 
decisions the government made that compounded the risk.”96 In order to meet increased 
demands for food, and in keeping with its desire to remain self-reliant, the government 
used damaging agricultural processes to try and procure as much out of the land as it 
could.  This had a great impact on soil erosion across the country, only enhancing the 
impact of the monsoons in 1995 and 1996.97 
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Figure 2.  Real GDP Growth98 
The situation at hand was a perfect illustration of Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s 
vicious circle.  Through the first fifty years of its existence the Kim family regime had 
managed to build itself a politically and economically extractive system that enabled it to 
pull the most from the economy and the people in order to secure regime power. While 
the party elite continued to live comfortably, the state around them was crumbling and 
the people were beginning to starve.  True to the extractive nature of authoritarian 
regimes, the Kim family and their inner circle proved to be insulated from political 
fallout and therefore faced no political accountability for the failure to provide the basic 
necessities of living as promised. Despite sporadic protests, no true challenge to the 
regime’s claim to rule emerged from the tumultuous situation. In this regard the impact of 
the political system and the ideology was felt two-fold.  Not only did it contribute directly 
to the economic crisis, but it also created a situation in which, “The lack of infrastructure 
and communication channels across regions within North Korea, was well as contact with 
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the outside world, inhibits the possibility that…organized resistance might spring up to 
challenge the current leadership.”99 Lankov echoes the stark harshness of situation when 
he writes that “Trained under the old system, deprived of opportunities to organize, and 
ignorant about the outside world, North Korea’s starving farmers did not rebel[, t]hey just 
died.”100 
Perhaps more telling than the famine and collapse itself was the regime’s actions 
leading up to and immediately after the famine.  Despite massive starvation and a 
mounting death toll, “Ideologically committed revolutionaries and security conscious 
elites alike objected to the idea of increased, individual cross-border traffic.”101 If the 
collapse and famine itself demonstrated the potential consequences of a highly extractive 
system, then the immediate response of the regime was a clear indication that survival 
was the guiding concern for Kim Jong-il and the elite. There were signs early on of a 
growing food shortage and that the Public Distribution System was failing to provide 
enough food for the population, yet the regime maintained course and refused to ask for 
help until it was too late. The PDS and the agricultural sector themselves were doomed 
from the beginning. In order to maintain its juche ideology, the government looked to 
compensate for limited natural resources and arable land, resulting in an input-reliant 
system that used high levels of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The regime succeeded 
in increasing yields, but production was “highly vulnerable to availability of these critical 
inputs, either from imports or from the industrial sector, which also relied on imported 
inputs.”102  
As the support from Soviet aid dried up and the domestic industrial sector failed, 
the snowball effect began and food shortages became increasingly prevalent. The regime 
attempted to insulate the problem and took measures such as enacting the “Let’s Eat Two 
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Meals per Day” campaign in attempts to handle the PDS food shortages.103 Despite 
several years of negative growth, it was not until the situation bottomed out in mid-1995 
that the regime finally reached out to ask for assistance, and even still the assistance came 
with regime-imposed difficulties that impacted the effectiveness of program. From the 
very beginning, the regime blocked attempts by the World Food Program (WFP) to 
monitor the dissemination of food aid, denied access to large areas of the country, limited 
the number of WFP workers to fifty, and banned any Korean-speakers from being on 
staff.  Additionally, it is estimated that around thirty percent of food aid was diverted 
directly to the military, a critical point to consider with Kim Jong-il’s elevation of the 
military’s status—a move that will be discussed in the following section.104  
Despite the prevalence of starving people throughout the country, the regime 
made it clear that it refused to relinquish control—even with the handling of 
humanitarian assistance—and demonstrated its willingness to put regime survival ahead 
of its people.  Even with food assistance the regime refused to take any chances of 
allowing outside information to be disseminated and thus harming the narrative and 
ideology that continued to perpetuate the legitimacy of the ruling party. The regime did 
turn a blind eye to the free markets they had once vehemently opposed, but only so long 
as it took to get the PDS back into full swing. To the credit of the Kim family and their 
inner circle, the plan had worked thus far and, in the face of economic turmoil, the people 
were more concerned with what their next meal would be than with figuring out how to 
blame for the situation. As Cha writes, “When one is as poor as a North Korean, one’s 
immediate concern is not to overthrow the system, it is merely to survive.”105 The great 
famine and economic collapse was a result of highly extractive practices on the part of 
the regime, and yet post-disaster these extractive measures continued without any 
credible challenge to the right to rule.  
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North Korea’s situation during its collapse and famine strongly resembled that of 
the People’s Republic of China a mere twenty years earlier.  In the 1970s China had 
emerged in tatters following the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the damaging 
Cultural Revolution. Through the 1960–1961 famine, “Roughly 30 million people, 
primarily the very young and the old, starved to death[, and n]early another 30 million 
who would have been born in this period were either stillborn or not conceived.”106 The 
Cultural Revolution itself, while not as deadly, caused great levels of violence and, 
“Although no reliable figures are available, those who suffered incarceration, serious 
injury, or death certainly reached into the millions.”107 China had emerged from the 
Maoist era in a fragile state, suffering from economic stagnation, great famine, and 
political infighting.  Much like North Korea would be two decades later, the PRC found 
itself in a position that demanded reform and a new set of policies to bring it out of 
depths of failure. The system in place at the time of Mao’s death in 1976 was one in 
which the market forces played almost no role, the priority was on heavy industry for 
defense, capital was used inefficiently, private property rights did not exist, there was 
very little international trade, and foreign investment and borrowing were not allowed.108 
Much like the Kim regime of North Korea, Deng Xiaoping desired to create a strong 
state, however, he recognized that to do so required an altering of domestic policy and an 
opening up to the international community. 
While the situations in post-crisis China and North Korea resemble one another, 
with similar economic and societal impacts result from each country’s respective famine, 
there was a unique characteristic present in the PRC that must be discussed. In comparing 
the two situations it is important to note that in post-Mao China reform was already 
beginning to take place on the periphery and on the local level. Change in policy did not 
occur spontaneously nor was it immediately implemented statewide. The larger policy 
decisions that impacted China as a whole were critical in their own right; however, “it 
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was in the countryside that reforms succeeded first, and it was the dramatic success of 
rural reforms that cleared the way for continuing and progressively more profound 
change.”109 North Korea, by comparison, had no such localized reform taking place as it 
trudged its way through the hard times of the 1990s. Outside of the capital city there were 
plenty of open markets that sprung forth, but as will be discussed later in this chapter, 
these markets were neither government sponsored nor were they reformist in nature. With 
its large rural interior and population, the provincial level reforms worked for China; 
however, with North Korea, “central political control would be placed in serious jeopardy 
by provincial economic autonomy.”110 For the North Korean regime, with its concern 
over maintain societal control, reforms would have to be implemented from the state 
level down, offering greater risk of failure. 
2. Feigning Reform and Military-First Ideology 
With the state economy in turmoil, a heavy dependence on foreign aid, and a new 
leader looking to solidify his position, the scene was set for the North Korean regime to 
pursue meaningful reforms. Having stopped abolishment campaigns against the free 
markets that developed in response to the PDS failure, the regime, “accept[ed] these 
markets on a temporary basis, pending the country’s return to economic health and its 
resumption of the march towards socialism.”111 In July of 2002, to make this shift in 
policy official, the government decriminalized market activities with the issuance of the 
Improved Economic Management Measures.112 Additionally, the government announced 
the plan to establish two special economic zones (SEZs) with the hopes of attracting 
foreign investment.  The Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone on the border 
with Russia and the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region on the border with China 
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offered great hopes that North Korea was finally moving towards opening up. These 
zones, unfortunately, proved to be little more than smoke and mirrors to feign regime-led 
attempts at reviving the North Korean economy. Much like the earlier mentioned 
reforms, these areas withered away and became more examples of wasted opportunities.  
These ventures, “Would require a level of transparency [the regime] would not be 
comfortable with[, and t]hey naively assumed that simply announcing that they were 
open for business would draw hordes of hungry investors.”113  
China, years before, had experimented with SEZs and to a much greater success. 
In comparing the SEZ policies of the two socialist states it is evident that the CCP had 
every intention of successfully creating incentives for foreign investment while 
Pyongyang allowed the fear of losing control dictate policy once again. Simply looking at 
the locations chosen for the zones indicates a continued fear of direct foreigner-North 
Korean interaction.  For Beijing, “The purpose of establishing SEZs in China [was] to 
make full use of geographical advantages,” and with this they were strategically placed. 
The five zones were placed on the southeast coast in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
Xiamen, and Hainan within close proximity of Hong Kong and Macao.  These locations 
make them attractive to foreign investors and give them access to information and 
transportation that connects them to the international system.114 Pyongyang, on the other 
hand, placed their zones in more remote locations with Rajin-Sonbong chosen 
specifically, “because of its location far from the main population centers (to prevent 
contact with foreigners).”115 While Beijing placed their zones in prime locations to 
enhance their appeal and success, Pyongyang did so to ensure their isolation.  
Outside of location, a difference in commitment level can also be seen between 
the PRC and North Korea.  In North Korea, “Manufacturing investment…did not come—
in large part because of dilapidated infrastructure, official corruption, and only partial 
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adherence to agreed-upon economic reforms in the areas.”116 Two key characteristics of 
China’s SEZs are that they “maintain close economic relations with other parts of the 
country instead of adopting isolative administrative measures [and] the zones serve as the 
country’s trial centre for reform by actively exploring reform measures.”117 While 
China’s policies encouraged the benefits of the SEZs to expand into the surrounding 
areas, Pyongyang was busy building barbed-wire fences around Rajin-Sonbong. For 
Beijing, the SEZs were another active measure in reforming the economic system and 
opening China up to international markets.  For Kim Jong-il and his regime, they were 
another example that political survival and societal control was the first priority. 
In order to recover from disaster, North Korea needed to truly reform its 
economic system and open itself up to foreign trade, placing a premium on economic 
performance much like its communist brethren in China had under Deng Xiaoping.  
Having witnessed an economically liberalized authoritarian system in South Korea lose 
out to democracy, the regime’s reluctance is understandable.  Despite this, the reformists 
that may have existed within the political elite still had China to point to as a model of 
success. By 2000, “[China’s] $1 trillion economy was already bigger than all other 
transition economies combined,” and outside of the 1989 Tiananmen events it had 
achieved this “without complete liberalization, without privatization, and without 
democratization.”118 For Deng Xiaoping the choice for reform was a necessary choice to 
secure both China’s future and the CCP’s.  In Deng’s view, “Only major reform would 
permit the CCP to remain in power [and t]he party…would have to improve the standard 
of living of the populace, and to do this it would have to eschew Maoist egalitarianism 
and collectivism.”119 Additionally, “Deng regarded the necessity of keeping pace with 
the worldwide trends toward technological dynamism and economic efficiency as a 
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matter of China’s long-term national security.”120 While both Deng and Kim sought 
international recognition for their respective countries, they did so under much different 
methodology. Deng recognized that economic modernization and sustained growth would 
create a strong state. Kim Jong-il, on the other hand, looked to militarization, and in 
particular nuclear weapons, as a way to gain respect on the international stage. The 
conflict between risking loss of political control and achieving economic growth, 
however, proved to be impossible to overcome for the ruling elite in North Korea. In the 
end, the regime, “[Seemed] deeply frightened by the consequences of opening up the 
economy, preferring instead to open tiny coastal enclaves.”121  
Given the context of the strength/legitimacy circle discussed in Chapter III, it is 
understandable that the regime would steer away from policies that could poke holes into 
the veil of propaganda that enabled the regime to control information and perpetuate its 
legitimacy.  More than fear, however, there was also a lack of need for true reform in the 
eyes of Kim Jong-il and his inner circle. The leadership had survived this long without 
pursuing economic development, was not answerable to the general public, and despite 
the starving masses there was no public dissent attributing North Korea’s troubles to the 
poor decisions of its trusted leadership.  Even if there were, the gulags and public 
executions were more than a viable option to quiet the murmurs of disagreement. True 
reform would benefit the country as a whole and improve the lives of the average North 
Korean citizen, but as examples in Eastern Europe and—more importantly—South Korea 
show, this increase in quality of life comes with an increase in expectations from the 
people.122 The unfortunate reality is that the regime only had to concern itself with 
keeping the elites and military happy and, “while they [puzzled] over their political 
dilemma of control versus economic reform, Kim and his top cadres [lived] a comfortable 
life far from the poverty and starvation of the average North Korean citizen.”123 
Remaining committed to the ideology and nationalistic led militarization was easy for the 
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political elite who still lived in relative luxury despite the collapse.  As the time 
progressed and the government once again shifted policy, it became clear that the 
economy existed more as another form of population control than as a viable measure of 
regime legitimacy.  
The regime emerged from the economic crisis of the 1990s on an altered path in 
terms of political structure and ideology. While careful to still offer filial piety to his 
father—the Great Leader—and his juche ideology, Kim Jong-il began to shift the system 
to his new form of military-first politics, songun chongchi.  Unlike Kim Il-sung, the son 
had no former military heroics to cling to and build a legacy upon, causing him to seek a 
tight alignment with the military.  He was named as chairman of the National Defense 
Commission (NDC) and in doing so made it the primary decision-making body. These 
efforts removed the separation between the military and the civilian population, 
effectively creating a military culture in North Korea.124 Kim Jong-il secured the critical 
support of the military elites by elevating their status within society and redoubling 
efforts to ensure military programs were funded at all costs. As Cha notes, “Throughout 
the early 1990s…North Korea is estimated to have spent 25 percent of its GDP on its 
military budget.”125 McEachern echoes this change, writing that “The military had long 
enjoyed prioritized resource allocation, but this military-first ideological move raised the 
military’s political and social status.”126  
It could be observed that this new ideology replaced juche, but in reality the two 
became complementary in the aftermath of economic collapse with juche principles 
serving to justify songun politics. As Park and Lee write, “Songun politics on its own 
would likely prove to be unsustainable because [it imposed] massive economic hardship[, 
and] the juche ideology was largely bankrupt in terms of facilitating economic self-
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sufficiency.”127 In essence, songun was the next step in the juche ideology and, “If juche 
represented North Korean independence and autonomy, embodied in the Great Leader 
Kim Il Sung, songun placed the defense of that independence in the vanguard institution 
of the military, closely identified with General Kim Jong Il.”128 The continued U.S. 
presence on the Korean peninsula and the increased pressure to halt North Korea’s 
nuclear program helped to provide further fuel for the military machine. Capitalizing on 
the early use of nationalism as a source of legitimacy, the regime built on the existing 
xenophobia and the threat of encirclement to help justify the high military spending Kim 
Jong-il began after his father’s death.129 Much like his father, Kim Jong-il relied on 
ideological indoctrination to convince both the elites and the masses of the need for this 
shift in guiding principle.130 As the situation he inherited required a divergence from 
purely ideology driven policy, Kim Jong-il understood the important of co-opting the 
powerful military elite, particularly those who had served in the guerilla forces under his 
father. In doing so, “Kim…proclaimed the military the ‘pillar’ of socialism and at the 
forefront of the revolution.”131 While this decision helped to consolidate his power, the 
military-first path would only bring about more economic struggles. 
3. Blackmail and International Exploitation: Keeping the Economy 
Afloat 
From the regime’s very beginning, the presence of foreign aid and support has 
been critical to allowing Pyongyang to pursue the policies it desired with little regard to 
economic development.  In the wake of the collapse and great famine of the 1990s, the 
new regime took those lessons from Kim Il-sung and created an aid-dependent regime 
with an unmatched ability to extract needed food and support from friends and foes alike. 
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Kim Jong-il was able to play the fears of an unstable North Korea off the humanitarian 
cries to save the North Korean people to essentially fund the failing economy and support 
the continued military build-up. The son first put this practice into play with the nuclear 
crisis and subsequent Agreed Framework of October 1994.  In threatening to withdraw 
from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) the North Korean regime forced the hand of  
the United States—as well as Japan, South Korea, and others—resulting in numerous 
benefits for North Korea, including the supply of light-water reactors to help with  
energy problems, long-term loans valued at around four billion dollars, and the upgrading 
of diplomatic relations.132 As will be discussed later in the chapter, this would not be the 
last time nuclear weapons would be used as a bargaining chip. Instead, it was a 
foreshadowing that North Korea cannot give up nuclear weapons altogether as they serve 
as leverage with the international community.133 
The nuclear weapons issue helped to fuel the larger exploitative threat utilized by 
the regime, the fear of an unstable or collapsed North Korea. With North Korea’s large 
military and nuclear weapons, “Leaders in Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington fear a 
highly uncertain and dangerous transition phase featuring humanitarian and refugee 
crises, a ‘loose nukes’ problem, and the potential for war between nuclear-armed great 
powers.”134 This fear led to large amounts of aid to flow in from countries that the North 
considers to be its greatest threats.  The regime recognized that “Continuing with ‘bad 
behavior’ such as nuclear proliferation activity enables North Korea to offer to cease such 
behavior in return for much larger concessions than it has received in the past.”135 While 
the United States tapered off aid over frustrations with the lack of transparency, South 
Korea and China continued to provide food aid with few strings attached. This aid 
reached its peak under the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae Jung and the Peace and 
Prosperity Policy of Roh Moo-hyun whereby South Korea was the either largest or 
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second-largest provider of food aid annually.136 Much like Kim Il-sung did during the 
Sino-Soviet split, the younger Kim, “deftly played on fears of a possible U.S.-Chinese 
rivalry, as well as on Seoul’s anxieties about the consequences of North Korea’s 
implosion…to secure a moderate but steady flow of assistance from their neighbors.”137 
So much so that “Rather than augmenting the economy with this foreign aid as a way to 
divert national resources to needed reforms, the government simply consumed the aid as 
a form of revenue.”138 By playing the system and taking advantage of fears, the new Kim 
regime was able to follow in his father’s footsteps and utilize foreign support to fund bad 
policy decisions.  In this regard, the reality is that the international community became 
the financier of the military build-up most countries wanted to stop. 
4. Let There Be Free Trade! 
While Kim Jong-il and his party elite politically survived economic collapse, the 
regime did not come out of the situation completely unscathed.  From the ashes of state 
failure and a shutdown of the PDS arose a new force driving change at the bottom—free 
marketization. It must be noted, however, that this was not a result of state decision to 
introduce free markets into the DPRK but rather a regime decision to not actively seek to 
stop markets. A divergence began to appear with this free market movement, a 
differentiation between regime legitimacy and regime strength.  In the eyes of most North 
Koreans, the regime remained the legitimate leaders of the state, but its economic failings 
forced people to take matters into their own hands. The irony of the situation is that the 
policy of self-reliance practiced for so many years created the very situation it was meant 
to avoid. Backed into an economic corner, many North Koreans died at the hands of 
famine and disease, but many more utilized creative thinking and took matters into their 
own hands. For most of the country, “Nobody told the people what to do—the North 
Korean government didn’t want to admit to the extent of the food shortage—so they 
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fended for themselves.”139 With the great famine and failure of the state to provide the 
basic necessities of life, “private economic activity [became] the only way to survive for 
a vast majority of the people.”140  
Unlike China, the marketization movement in North Korea started at the very 
bottom of the social and political ladder, in spite of government policy rather than 
because of it. In the early 1990s, “As the primary economy…collapsed, a secondary 
civilian economy…sprung up, consisting of widespread bribery, pilfering, bootleg 
production, and trade in people’s markets.”141 In North Korea the introduction of free 
market trading was sprung forth by those outside the capital city and left to their own 
means of survival. The PRC, on the other hand, introduced marketization through 
deliberate policy decisions that allowed the government to control its implementation. 
The political leaders of China utilized a dual track approach that blended both goods at 
fixed planned prices and goods traded in a market according to market prices. This plan 
“[Represented] a mechanism for the implementation of a reform without creating 
losers.”142 This approach allowed the PRC to slowly bring about an efficient economic 
system that led to continued economic growth and development. Despite the model the 
Chinese provided, the markets of North Korea continued to exist solely as a means of 
individual survival and the regime failed to seize the momentum and transfer this activity 
into meaningful development. Survival consumed the average North Korean’s day and, 
“All ingenuity was devoted to the gathering and production of food.”143 
The political leadership’s response to these markets waivered over the years, 
going from opposition, to acceptance, and back to opposition—and always skipping over 
encouragement. The market reforms of 2002 offered hope that the regime was finally 
shifting policy and taking economics seriously, but “Pyongyang authorized monetization 
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of the economy and authorization of farmers’ markets to buy and sell goods…largely 
because the public distribution system had broken down.”144 While the government may 
have had no other choice but to relax its stance, the markets represented a loss of political 
control for the central government and, “The North Korean elites know that the greatest 
threats they face are internal, not external, and that resisting reform is the most effective 
way to control the population.”145 While there existed a period of accepting the growing 
movement, the regime took every opportunity to oppose the continued existence of these 
markets despite the signs that traders are not ceasing the activity. By virtue of this act, the 
regime appeared to be losing some of its reach into society and life away from the capital 
city, displaying a potential weakening in the tight arm of control it had possessed for so 
many years.  
C. LIFE AFTER DEATH 
1. Nuclear Expansion and Counter Reforms 
Emerging out of economic collapse, the Kim regime was once again faced with a 
critical decision point regarding the future path of the state’s policies.  Much of the 
outside world looked on with hopes that the new leader’s apparent commitment to 
economic reforms and denuclearization would remain true. A series of events beginning 
in the mid-2000s quickly laid to rest these hopes and the leadership in Pyongyang once 
again proved that internal control, regime survival, and ideology were far more important 
than economic growth.  
Just prior to the great famine North Korea had signed on to the Agreed 
Framework of 1994, effectively putting a halt on its nuclear program and ushering in a 
wave of concessions from the United States and helping to open the door for much 
needed food aid. In October of 2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear 
detonation that had varying impacts on the regime and the economy and proved that the 
1994 agreement was not successful.  The consistent and rapid pursuit of nuclear weapons 
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must be viewed through two lenses to truly understand its impact. In the context of the 
new military-first ideology and the ever-present pursuit of national security, this decision 
made sense. Developing nuclear weapons was justifiable when following the continued 
narrative that North Korea must do whatever it could to protect itself from outside 
aggressors, namely the nuclear-armed United States. In the eyes of the regime, obtaining 
nuclear weapons was a game-changer that gave it a great deterrent and bargaining power 
with the international community. For the regime, “That deterrent enabled North Korea to 
restore a semblance of balance on the peninsula after the enormous effectiveness of 
Seoul’s northern policy that initially skewed inter-Korean power dynamics heavily in 
South Korea’s favor.”146  
Committing to nuclear weapons also demonstrated Kim Jong-il’s commitment to 
the songun ideology and helped to solidify his standing with the military. This tool, 
however, came at a great expense, and from the lens of good economics the decision to 
pursue nuclear weapons was a disastrous one. It once again demonstrated the regime’s 
preference to garner short-term political gains as opposed to long-term sustainability. 
Commitment to the program represented a great drain on the already fragile North 
Korean economy, leaving few resources left to devote to rebuilding industrial 
infrastructure. It is estimated that the military-first policy and its nuclear armament 
campaign constitute approximately 25 percent of the country’s GDP, placing military 
priorities well above the civilian economy.147 Outside of tying up much of the country’s 
already small budget, the nuclear program further alienated North Korea from most of the 
rest of the world and impacted its ability to bring in foreign trade and investment.  In 
addition to the UN sanctions that followed the 2006 nuclear test and the subsequent tests 
afterwards, a nuclear North Korea created mistrust among the international community. 
While the bomb may have brought Kim and his inner circle a greater sense of security, 
the fact is that “Unless Pyongyang moves to abandon its nuclear program completely, the 
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international community is unlikely to expand its currently marginal economic interaction 
with North Korea.”148 
If the recommitment to nuclear weapons was not enough to dash all hopes of 
meaningful change, then Kim Jong-il’s reneging on the reforms themselves was enough 
to demonstrate the priorities of the regime.  While instilling the songun ideology and 
large amounts of military spending were passive means of demonstrating a lack of 
concern for economic modernization, the regime also took an active role in pushing back 
the external calls for change.  In 2005, with the worst of the food crisis behind them, the 
regime announced it was bringing back the PDS and made the selling of grain on the 
markets illegal.  Additionally, it banned women younger than fifty and all men from 
working on the markets, calling for these individuals to return to the factories that had 
once been a great tool of population control. With no investment into rebuilding these 
factories, it was clear that the move was political in nature and a way to regain strict 
control over society the regime had lost in the turmoil of the famine and collapse.149  
Thus the regime began to once again take action—through policy and propaganda 
—against the markets that had become vital to the everyday survival of most North 
Koreans.  Rather than seizing on the opportunity that nascent markets presented to pursue 
an economic path similar to post-Mao China, the regime saw them only as a threat to its 
legitimacy and security. With the 2002 market liberalization reforms, “Neither the 
language nor the nature of the reforms carried the same conviction of those seen in China 
or Vietnam.”150 True to its form, the regime used the propaganda machine to warn that 
openness and reform would destabilize the socialist system and bring with a similar 
demise that the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries experienced after allowing 
in imperialist ideology and culture.151 Finally, in 2009 the regime took another bold step 
in the attempt to reestablish society’s dependency and regain control. In November of 
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that year the regime enacted a currency revaluation followed by attempts to shut down 
the markets and ban foreign currency.152 While these moves were met with some level of 
public outcry the government had made it clear that it was still in control and willing to 
sacrifice economic gains to maintain its position on top.  
2. A Dark Horse of Hope? 
With the sudden passing of Kim Jong-il in 2011 a widely unknown, fresh-faced 
new leader was thrust into the spotlight.  The world knew little of Kim Jong-un other than 
the fact that he was young and the heir-apparent to the North Korean throne.  Unlike his 
father, Kim Jong-un had little time as an apprentice to learn the family business. This 
combined with his age led to speculation that he could face difficulty in consolidating 
power and garnering the loyalty of the much older generals and party elite that still held 
top positions.  At the same time, with several years of exposure to Western life as a 
student in Switzerland, there was some hope that perhaps North Korea finally had a 
leader that would alter the country’s path and follow in big brother China’s footsteps to 
economic reform.  These hopes, however, were quickly dashed as the young leader 
wasted no time in picking up where his father left off and once again putting military 
might and the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of economic development. 
True to the Kim hereditary pattern, Kim Jong-un seized on ideology as a guiding 
principle to policy decision and legitimacy. From this need to define his rule in the 
context of ideology, Kim Jong-un moved to a neojuche concept, blending the self-reliant 
economic policy of his grandfather with his father’s military-first policy and efforts to 
become a nuclear power.153 The attempt is being made to drive the system back to the 
Cold War glory days of mass mobilization and collectivization, a move directly against 
the grain of society and the current marketization movement.154 The issue with this move 
is that North Korea no longer has the communist backing of the Soviet Union nor the 
level of Chinese support it once had that enabled the original juche ideology to work. The 
                                                 
152 Cha, The Impossible State, 156–57.       
153 Ibid., 153.  
154 Cha and Anderson, “A North Korean Spring?” 7. 
 60
regime, however, has little choice because, “It needs a new ideology that has a positive 
vision for the new leader,” and more importantly, “[neojucheism] attributes past poor 
performance of the state…not to Kim Jong-il, but to the ‘mistakes’ of allowing 
experimentation with reform that ‘polluted’ the ideology.”155  
In this regard, the ideology is playing two critical roles.  In attributing the failures 
to a divergence from pure socialist thinking, the regime is attempting to uphold the Kim 
family claim to the right to rule.  Admitting that Kim Jong-il was responsible for the 
failures of the 1990s and 2000s would call into question his right to rule and with it the 
right to pass the torch to his son.  Additionally, this ideology continues the narrative that 
the state will provide for the people and that North Korea can thrive on its own accord—
without the poisoning of the imperialists. Once again playing to the strong sense of 
nationalism that was used by Kim Il-sung to garner legitimacy in the beginning, in 2012 
the regime began promoting a new goal of kangsong taeguk, or powerful and prosperous 
nation.156 In this regard, “If Kim Jong Un can be associated with a revived economy and 
strong defense, his legitimacy will be strongly grounded.”157 Perpetuating ideology 
similar to that of Kim Il-sung—and developing the grandson’s image to resemble the 
Great Leader—has allowed the regime to link the third generation of rule with the 
foundation that was laid in the 1950s. The issue remains, however, that the collectives 
that once existed directly contradict with the new independent way of life that the 
markets have brought. The tides shifted and, “The North Koreans once accepted being 
completely dependent on the government[, but n]ow they realize that they might be able 
to survive without its handouts.”158 Despite this growing conflict, the present day regime 
remains legitimate in the eyes of the populace and continues to, “try to sap every bit of 
labor and individualism out of the population as they prepare for a new leader to 
command undisputed loyalty.”159 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The Kim Jong-il era in North Korea was both a trying time and another 
opportunity squandered.  Kim Il-sung had given up the chance to seize on his economic 
advantage in the 1950s and the younger Kim missed the chance to model itself after post-
Mao China and put in place the changes necessary to build a self-sustaining economy. 
With economic collapse and famine fresh in the minds of North Koreans and the Great 
Leader now deceased, the late 1990s and early 2000s was the opportune time for reform. 
Finding itself in a situation similar to that of the PRC in the 1970s, North Korea failed to 
follow the path of its socialist neighbor. Unlike China, the North Korean political 
structure made reform a difficult task. While China had a dual track system in place that 
allowed for those on the margin to gain without having any political or economic losers, 
North Korea’s system is rent-seeking-heavy. In this latter type of system reform would 
cause the political elite to lose out as those on the margin benefited from the new 
economic policies. In this context, economic reform would have been good for the 
country but bad for the leadership’s personal wealth. Instead, Kim Jong-il—concerned 
only with regime security—chose to continue to perpetuate the legitimacy of his father 
while also creating his own through his songun politics. With this decision, the son 
placed the military as the first priority, solidifying his relationship with the leadership and 
in turn securing his position on top. His only real achievement of the time was the 
advancement of the nuclear weapons program that brought about more internal 
legitimacy and gave the regime bargaining power with the international community, but 
it did little to ease the economic woes of a suffering populace. The massive amount of 
spending on the military and the nuclear program, however, was a great drain on the 
North Korean populace.  
Furthermore, the regime utilized ideology to demand more sacrifice from the 
people and exploitive maneuvers to garner aid from the international community.  Rather 
than using this aid to supplement effective spending measures, North Korea became 
dependent on it as a main source of income and a way to continue its extractive ways. In 
the mid-2000s with the economy backed away from the ledge, the regime once again 
took steps to actively quash the free markets that had developed as a means of survival 
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for much of the population.  While these steps were met with some public disobedience, 
it was clear that the regime was attempting to reassert control over the country and that 
the half-hearted reforms were out of necessity to survive rather than real attempts to 
change the system. Propaganda and ideological indoctrination was once again utilized to 
justify the need to return to the socialist ways, with strong-arm tactics and the gulags 
waiting to collect any dissenters.  
The end of 2011 brought with it the end of the Kim Jong-il period of rule in North 
Korea. The death of the Dear Leader brought in a new generation of Kim family rule, and 
with it, came a renewed sense of hope that change was possible. With the apparent return 
to neojuche ideology, however, Kim Jong-un seems to have continued to perpetuate the 
system that his grandfather began over sixty years ago. By blaming the failed reforms of 
his father’s time on a straying from core socialist ideology, the regime has been able to 
isolate itself from the blame while justifying continued poor economic decisions. 
Although its legitimacy appears to be intact, the regime has yet to fully eradicate the free 
markets that flourish outside the capital city—a fact that could be detrimental to the its 
survival. Resisting these markets has not ended them, and while the legacy of Kim Il-
sung and the regime legitimacy remains unchallenged, it is losing the control mechanism 
that has demonstrated its strength in the past. Resisting the changing economic system is 




This thesis sought to shed further light on what drives regime legitimacy in North 
Korea. The regime’s survival of economic collapse in the 1990s appeared to defy logic, 
but not if a clear understanding of North Korean political system is held.  History and 
evidence indicates that economic performance had little bearing on Kim Il-sung’s rise to 
power and did not impact the ability to perpetuate this power through two generations of 
Kim family rule. With great loyalty and trust built towards the regime, there has been 
little connection between economic failure and political fallout. Thus far there has been 
little movement on the part of citizens, not analysts, to attribute the dire situation directly 
to the misguided policy and ideology that has been used to govern the country.  In fact, it 
may be safe to say that the everyday North Korean citizen is more concerned with where 
the next meal will come from than who is responsible for that struggle.  
If there is no real hope that economic failure will lead to a broader political 
movement then why does the international community continue to hold out for one? 
Beginning with the economic collapse of the early 1990s, “Numerous observers have 
predicted the collapse of North Korea since the death of the country’s founding leader 
Kim Il-sung in July 1994.”160 Within the U.S., the idea that the regime would implode is 
“a mantra that began with Bush I and lasted through Clinton and Bush II, right down to 
the present.”161 Are policy actions such as the recent economic sanctions really effective? 
Does making it harder for Kim Jong-un and his cronies to purchase a Mercedes really 
have hope to enforce change? To be sure these sanctions have had an impact on North 
Korea, but perhaps not as intended. The North Korean people are still suffering and the 
regime has appeared to only double down on its pursuit of nuclear weapons rather than 
enact reform. The idea behind sanctions is to make it harder on the political elite within  
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North Korea, but the Pyongyang propaganda machine seems to spin them to feed the 
hyper-nationalistic world-is-against-us driver of isolationist policies. With North Korea, 
“Diplomatic pressure and UN Security Council resolutions produce a defiant reaction,” 
and a belief that North Korea must carry out nuclear weapons tests, “as a part of an ‘all-
out action’ against the United States, which it call[s] ‘the sworn enemy of the Korean 
people.’”162 In trying to push the regime towards denuclearization, “economic sanctions 
have only marginal impact economically, and understanding the regime’s internal 
functions helps explain how these moves simply antagonize the regime rather than 
making any strategic advance.”163Additionally, North Korea has become a master at 
exploiting the international community, including the United States and South Korea, as a 
continued method to bring in capital and resources that are used to keep the economy and 
the regime afloat.  
In short, it must be understood that North Korea is governed by a highly 
extractive regime that will do whatever it takes to remain in power. There are thus several 
questions to consider in discussion of the implications for the future.  With the Kim 
regime in its third generation, is there any new hope that the new leadership will seek 
meaningful reform in the face of an international community—to include China—that is 
growing weary of the hermit kingdom’s antics? Regardless of the answer to this question, 
what steps can the international community take in its handling of the situation that could 
force the regime’s hand? Finally, and perhaps the key component to consider, is what 
impact the growing underground marketization will have on the regime’s capacity to 
control its people? 
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While the economy is in ruins, one thing the regime has accomplished is the 
ability to regulate the international community's knowledge of the true situation. North 
Korea has built a virtual wall along its borders, effectively controlling what the outside 
world knows of North Korea and what North Koreans know of the outside world. For this 
reason, “Very few are allowed to enter the country[, and] even fewer are allowed to 
exit.”164 Much of what we know today is gathered from the isolated accounts of defectors 
and what little data that has been made available. Demick acknowledges this fact in her 
book, remarking that in order to answer the right questions, “I had to talk to people who 
had left—defectors.”165 Scholars must rely on defector information as, “Ordinary citizens 
are not permitted to travel abroad [and] visitors to North Korea are permitted no 
unaccompanied or spontaneous contact with its people.”166 It is clear that the economy is 
in shambles and that little is being done to improve matters, but with no high level 
political defectors it is hard get a true reading in the standing of the Party and the regime. 
The fact, however, that many defectors today still talk of their economic struggles 
without placing blame on the regime speaks to the core argument of this thesis. These 
first-hand accounts offer evidence that the regime's power is derived from sources other 
than economic performance. Despite the current hardships faced by the majority of the 
North Koreans, “Defectors from North Korea show anger toward their former prison 
guards or toward corrupt bureaucrats, but this surprisingly does not aggregate into an 
anger to expel the Kim leadership.”167 The defectors themselves represent the low 
likelihood of the economic hardships translating into a political movement.  Rather than 
organizing protests, those suffering from economic woes simply leave the country. 
Additionally, despite its problems, many North Korean defectors remark that given the 
chance again they would gladly be born in the socialist state.168 How much of this today 
is fueled by coercive leverage and how much is upheld through the predicated ideological 
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legacies is hard to tell. What can be seen is that, at the basic population level at least, 
economic failure has yet to translate into political unrest. Whether it is from fear, lack of 
opportunity, lack of desire, or most likely a combination of the three, public political 
dissent is almost non-existent. In this regard economic growth has been and continues to 
be a low priority for the regime because it can afford to take this position. In today's 
international context, from the leadership's viewpoint, the risks associated with true 
economic reform seem to outweigh the rewards and could very well jeopardize the facade 
of legitimacy it has created. 
A. WILL THERE BE REFORM? 
At the end of the famine and collapse of the 1990s, the North Korean system was 
primed for government-led economic reform—that could have very closely paralleled, at 
least in spirit, Chinese economic modernization.  Today, with very little improvement in 
the overall economy and no real development to speak of, the hermit kingdom remains 
stuck in a situation that begs for new policies. The question remains, however, as to 
whether the third generation of the Kim family dynasty will ever pursue such meaningful 
policy changes or whether it will continue down the path of isolationist retrenchment. On 
the surface it seems as though reform is the only path that makes sense.  Developing a 
sustainable economy would give the North Korean regime the economic base it needs to 
effectively uphold its juche ideology and continued pursuit of nuclear weapons.  While it 
has been able to fund such a program—at the great expense of the overall health of the 
state—the regime would certainly benefit from a larger budget to work with. 
In the North Korean case—as this thesis has demonstrated—the answer is not this 
simple. The regime could take steps to better enable the nascent free markets to develop 
further, and—with the assistance of the propaganda arm—could spin the change in a way 
that is both justifiable and adds another feather in Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy cap. For the 
upper echelon, however, the highly extractive system is still working and, “because the 
political elites there live a comfortable life, they are satisfied with the status quo and have 
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little need to open the borders or reform the economy.”169 Additionally, with the free 
markets operating on their own for over 20 years in spite of the regime it is hard to say 
how successful such a campaign to claim credit for them would be. In the face of this 
unknown, and given the fact that the regime still rules as it wants without internal 
challenge, it is understandable that the true easy choice for Kim and his cronies is to 
continue the trend of choosing societal control over meaningful reform. 
Outside of simply misplaced incentives, a second hindrance to North Korea’s 
willingness to pursue economic reforms is the current trend towards further economic 
globalization.  In today’s international environment, economic modernization requires an 
opening up to foreign trade and foreign investors—a dangerous game for the North 
Korean regime. Foreign investors require at least some degree of transparency and, as the 
failed special economic zones of the 2000s demonstrate, this is a measure the regime is 
not willing to take. Opening the borders to trade would benefit the economy, but it would 
also make it near impossible to continue the façade that North Korea is the socialist 
paradise its leadership claims it to be. Perpetuating this legacy would become extremely 
difficult given the fact that, “North Korea borders a rich and free country that speaks the 
same language and shares the same culture [and is] a real-life vision of what North Korea 
could and perhaps should be.”170 The regime’s tight control over the population has 
relied on its ability to control information and, “market reforms and increased foreign 
investment would unavoidably undermine this isolation.”171 As coercive leverage has 
continued to grow as a critical tool for the regime, its fear of losing control has continued 
to mount. For authoritarian regimes, “They maintain control through the silence of 
people’s fears, but they also cultivate deep anger beneath the surface[, and] once the fear 
dissipates, the anger boils to the surface.”172 Additionally, in order for true market reform 
to succeed, “the government would have to tolerate information exchange, travel between 
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different areas of the country, and the growth of horizontal connections beyond its direct 
control.”173 It is not certain that foreign trade and greater reform would translate directly 
to calls for political liberalization, but at the very least it would represent a further loss of 
control and expose a greater portion of the North Korea population to the true nature of 
the world outside the virtual walls. 
It is not just a loss of control that the regime fears. The impact of such opening 
could very well jeopardize the true basis of its legitimacy and would contradict the 
narrative and self-reliant ideology that has been perpetuated through the years.  In the 
past, Soviet and Chinese aid has been spun in such a way that it coincides with juche 
ideology; however, a full commitment to international trade is much more difficult to 
justify in terms of self-reliance, especially when trading with capitalist, democratic states. 
The credibility of the anti-imperial legacy interwoven within the Kim family story would 
quickly fade away if North Korea were to begin trading with the very countries the 
leadership has claimed to protect its people from.  Even if trade relationships were not 
established with the terrible three—United States, South Korea, and Japan—it is difficult 
to imagine a reformed system that did not interact with non-socialist systems. 
Additionally, with economic opening would come a less hostile international community, 
eating away at the need for a military-first policy and poking holes in a plan that 
advocates the need for a strong military above all else. In this regard it is not that the 
regime lacks the capability to reform.  Rather, for a regime so entangled in the legacy of 
the Cold War and dependent upon a legitimacy no longer relevant to today’s international 
system, there is no choice but to maintain the course and rely on strong-arm control to 
stay in power. Despite current economic woes, “only when the regime prizes wealth and 
growth more than its vice-like grip on power will true economic reform come to the 
North.”174 Unfortunately, the rigidity of the North Korean system will continue to 
prevent this from happening. 
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B. WHAT CAN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DO? 
First and foremost the international community must stop anticipating that current 
economic woes will translate into regime collapse or domestic calls for political reform.  
What this thesis has aimed to show is that in the North Korean system there seems to be 
no correlation between economic catastrophe and political control. While political failure 
in terms of failed policy has translated into economic disaster, the economic disaster has 
not caused political failure in terms of a collapsed regime. North Korea presents the 
international community with a unique, challenging, and perhaps even unanswerable 
question.  At the core of the problem is the fact that those outside of the inner regime elite 
know very little of its true inner workings and current stability. Lacking an understanding 
of the real situation makes it difficult for policy-makers to shape effective policy. What is 
clear is that all actions taken up to this point have had a negative impact, if any impact at 
all, on the hopes to reform Pyongyang. Foreign aid and support allowed the regime to 
claw its way back from economic disaster and U.S.-led actions to punish the rogue state 
have only reinforced the basic arguments for the need to adhere to strict self-reliant 
ideology. With the lack of role that economic performance plays in shaping North Korean 
policy, pressures to change—such as economic sanctions—have proven to have little 
success.  Additionally, with no real indication of reform-minded individuals within the 
country, encouragement for such economic changes appears to fall on deaf ears.   
One step the international community could take would be to present a united 
front and cut off all aid and foreign support to North Korea. The harsh reality is that 
regardless of how much aid is dumped into the country the net result is still the same for 
most people.  Putting an end to foreign support would effectively sever one of the few 
legs the regime has to stand on. A potential outcome of such a measure is that it could 
prove to be a strong enough catalyst to force the regime into reforms. As the regime once 
again loses its ability to provide for the people the growing illegal free-marketization—an 
increasing threat to the regime’s control over society—would continue to expand. A 
second potential outcome of an international blockade against North Korea could be an 
all-out collapse of the system and the regime. With no saving grace for poor policy 
decisions and no desire to reform, the regime would find itself in an unsalvageable 
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situation. This latter outcome resembles the path the country is currently on, just at an 
accelerated rate.  One problem with this plan is that Pyongyang has proven itself to be 
very resourceful and resilient under conditions of extreme pressure. As extractive as the 
regime in North Korea is, it has proven its willingness to sacrifice its people in order to 
pursue its own gains and it has displayed a willingness to venture into the world of illegal 
trade to supplement state income. Additionally, for the international community to 
present a united front is much easier said than done.  While the United States has ceased 
much of its aid to North Korea, convincing China and South Korea—the two countries 
who would bear the brunt of the burden in the event of collapse—to cut off Kim and his 
cronies is all but impossible—particularly China.  Without going into greater depth, 
keeping North Korea stable and the regime afloat is in the PRC’s best strategic and 
economic interests. To continue its economic rise, China needs a stable environment and, 
“an uncontrollable exodus of refugees…would severely tax the economic resources of the 
Chinese central government [, and] massive flows of refugees would likely paralyze and 
threaten social stability in China’s chronically poor northeastern provinces.”175 From a 
strategic standpoint, “Beijing is still disturbed by the reality that the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) is home to around 29,000 U.S. troops and Marines and that its current alliance 
with the U.S. is stronger than ever.”176 
C. CORRUPTION IS THE KEY 
The argument for marketization in North Korea is not simply that it will 
necessarily lead to calls for democratization. Cha and Anderson make such an argument, 
claiming that with the flow of goods across the border comes the flow of new ideas. This 
argument has some merit as there are many historical examples of such a movement 
happening--the country to the south of the DMZ offers the closest example. The impact 
in North Korea, however, is a bit different.  While it is hard to ignore the reports from 
defectors who remark an increase in bootleg material and illegal access to foreign media 
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and movies, these individuals also claim that their defection was purely economical and 
not political. Additionally, if there is something the regime has done successfully it is 
creating an environment devoid of the infrastructure and means to organize a movement.  
Citizens cannot travel outside of their town without government approval let alone to 
organize.  
Yet markets offer another potential spark for reform. While there is little 
indication that these capitalist-style markets are more than just means of surviving at 
present, they are a way for the North Korean people to exercise independence from the 
regime and they represent a key change in North Korean society—one that conflicts with 
regime policy. While the regime continues to push its rigid ideology, “society is 
incrementally moving in a different direction from North Korea’s past—in large part, 
sparked by the economic failures of the government.”177 The key implication with these 
growing markets is the disobedience towards the regime and the growing indifference 
towards policy they represent. By the regime’s standards this is corruption; yet in effect it 
represents a movement towards individualization. Just as children eventually break the 
parental dependency chain and learn to provide for themselves so, too, are the North 
Korean people learning to become more self-sufficient.  
Indications show that North Koreans are shifting loyalty from the regime and its 
policies towards hard currency. In the midst of the PDS reinstitution and government 
crackdown citizens continue to rely on the markets and in 2008, “more than two-thirds of 
defectors admitted that half or more of their income came from private business 
practices.”178 In this regard, North Korean defectors openly admit to acting in direct 
disobedience of central government policy in order to benefit from open trading. The new 
accumulation of personal wealth and the need for the markets to survive is giving this 
closed society both the means and motivation to ignore policy. In order to continue, these 
free enterprisers must pay off local officials and authorities to turn a blind eye to 
enforcement. In doing so, this is effectively cutting off the security arm of the regime and 
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provides the potential to break the strength/legitimacy circle. Mobster movies often 
indicate that even the highest government official can be bought. In a unique country like 
North Korea perhaps this is more than just a fictional idea. If this so-called corruption is 
allowed to spread high enough and a senior party member is able to accrue both the 
monetary means and a significant portion of the state’s security apparatus perhaps there 
could be a real threat to Kim Jong-un from the inside. The Kim family has worked hard 
to co-opt the elite—but it is hard to imagine that there are not at least a few reformers 
within the Korean Worker's Party. Perhaps there are a couple of quiet dissenters waiting 
for the right time. It is a very dangerous thing for an authoritarian regime to appear weak 
and if the current trend continues this could be the image that develops. Additionally, 
while the Kim family has sought to surround themselves with loyal comrades, “this 
loyalty lasts only as long as the regime can continue the handouts, and the government’s 
capacity in this regard is increasingly shrinking.”179 Meanwhile, on the private markets, a 
growing North Korean middle class is expanding its monetary capacity. 
As these markets continue to flourish and more capital makes its way to local 
military and political officials the regime loses its reach outside of Pyongyang, thus 
causing a weakening in its security apparatus. Eradicating these markets has proven to be 
an impossible task thus far, and today, “The market economy is so necessary to the 
welfare of the people—including the officials who are supposed to police the markets—
that it will doubtless survive in some form.”180 Additionally, “As the North Korean 
military, police, and other local authorities all engage in the smuggling trade, corruption 
threatens to undermine any moral authority to which the regime may cling.”181 My 
argument is not a guarantee that a new regime would be reformist in nature, but it 
certainly has a better chance than the current situation under Kim Jong-un. How possible 
is this scenario? As with anything involving this country it is hard to predict. What is 
clear is that while the recent purge of his uncle was a clear sign that nobody is safe from 
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the young leader’s wrath, the public nature of the event could also indicate that such an 
internal threat is becoming a reality. Furthermore, “In recent accounts of North Korea, 
bustling markets, contempt for leaders, and a busy cross-border trade may indeed spell 
the eventual downfall of the Kim regime.”182 As Kim Jong-un continues his power 
consolidation and strict adherence to failed ideology he could very well seal his own fate, 
much as his predecessors doomed the country through the pursuit of self-reliance and 
security without the tools in place to remain self-sustaining.  
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